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ABSTRACT 
Henry Clay’s effect on the second party system is undeniable.  However, this thesis in-
tends to do more than chronicle Clay’s life.  By analyzing key points of Clay’s political career, 
one sees several key aspects of Clay’s political philosophy come to life.  Unionism, the role of 
the Constitution, and compromise are fundamental to Clay’s political perspective.  Other histo-
rians have argued that Clay was always motivated by “self-interest” and personal politics, but 
Clay’s politics never strayed far from national compromise and maintaining the Union.  
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INTRODUCTION: AN IDEAL BEGINNING  
The current political climate in America is divisive and vitriolic.  The disdain between po-
litical parties and their correlating ideologies is as corrosive and eroding to the cultural, social, 
and political unity of this country as the second party system leading up to the Civil War in the 
mid-nineteenth century.   Therefore, the topic of Henry Clay, the Great Compromiser, is appro-
priate now more than ever.  Although the purpose of this thesis does not touch on the modern 
implications of nineteenth century political ideologies, it does speak to an equally disruptive 
and politically bombastic time period, fraught with competing intellectual claims.   
This project will address the political philosophy of Henry Clay.  Clay was the leader of 
the Whig Party, the primary combatant with the Democratic Party for nearly thirty years.  How-
ever, the ideological origins of Clay’s political stance are often misconstrued.  It will be the pur-
pose of this paper to address Clay’s political philosophy, to understand its general makeup.  
Clay possessed an ideology which is best represented by his most endearing quality, the politi-
cal virtue of compromise.  First, I will explain the value of compromise in the context of nine-
teenth century politics.  Secondly, I intend to prove that Clay formulated his “philosophy of 
compromise” based on a set of constant principles: the immutability of the U.S. Constitution; 
the ever-present need to maintain the Union; and his belief in the power of popular sovereign-
ty. 
 The divisive discourse between the Whigs and the Democrats was not purely political, 
though.  Instead, politics was the physical manifestation of the two parties’ intellectual differ-
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ences. Despite leading historians like Daniel Walker Howe and Sean Wilentz defending Whig 
and Democratic sentiments, respectively, a new perspective is necessary to further the field 
and introduce new ways of understanding the second-party system, and the ideologies that in-
formed their politics.   
Wilentz argues that Clay was self-serving in his political gamesmanship, seeking to ac-
complish personal goals rather than adhere to what was best for the nation.  Furthermore, 
Wilentz and other prominent Jacksonian perceive Andrew Jackson and other Democrats as the 
forces of political change and well-being in the Second-party system. Even Whig historians, like 
Daniel Walker Howe, label Clay as a politician of “enlightened self-interest.”  It is as if both sides 
of the argument fail to recognize to numerous compromises Clay procured, the changes and 
amendments he made to his own philosophy to ensure their alignment with national interests, 
and to protect the integrity of the Union.  Clay’s politics were not self-interested, nor were they 
simply a part of a political game, at least not on the whole, and certainly not when his mark was 
most clearly made, i.e., in his compromises. By looking at four key aspects or moments in Clay’s 
political career, this view of Clay as a defender of the Union and a man capable of philosophical 
change for the country’s sake will become self-evident.  
The first chapter introduces Clay’s perspective on slavery as an institution.  Slavery was 
the dividing line for all major political action and thought. Therefore, it is necessary to address 
Clay’s personal and political view of the “abhorred practice.”  Clay did own slaves, thus much of 
this chapter will attempt to explain how Clay formed his opinion on slavery, how he justified 
owning slaves while attempting to convince others of gradual emancipation, and finally what 
ideals informed his perspective, i.e. unionism. 
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The second chapter will focus on the introduction of the American System in 1816.  In-
troduced by Clay and John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, the American System was based on the 
concept of internal improvements.  The system meant higher tariffs on imports to protect 
American industry, building roads to connect major markets across the eastern sea board, and 
canals to allow coastal trading further inland.  Also a part of the American system was the inclu-
sion of a national bank, a major point contention and intrigue for Clay and his relationship with 
Democratic leaders, namely Andrew Jackson.     
The third chapter begins with the Tariff of 1828.  The “Tariff of Abominations” was really 
an extension of the American System Clay had introduced ten years earlier.  The Tariff was in-
tended to protect small businesses from having to compete directly with well-established Euro-
pean manufacturing.  South Carolina threatened secession because it saw the tariff as a direct 
assault on Southern economic interests.  The South was a major trading partner with England 
and failure to afford English goods, which prior to the tariff were cheaper, not only meant more 
expenses, but arguably had an effect on Britain’s willingness to buy Southern cotton.  The Con-
stitutionality of the tariff was immediately put into question by Southerners.  Clay addressed 
the issue by attempting to reach yet another compromise in 1833 during what came to be 
known as the Nullification Crisis.  South Carolina believed it had the right to nullify the tariff, 
thereby ignoring it, because they deemed it unConstitutional, but Clay and John C. Calhoun 
helped bridge the gap between Northern and Southern economic interests again.  Clay intro-
duced a bill which slowly reduced the tariff annually for the length of its lifespan, and the coun-
try again maintained some sense of unity, even if only in physical form. 
The final chapter is a thorough look at the Compromise of 1850.  Clay had come out of 
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retirement to help settle yet another dispute in Congress which threatened the integrity of the 
Union.  New territories were being added due to America’s success in the Mexican-American 
War, and, similar to the debate in 1820, the question was what would be slave and what would 
be free territory.  To help settle the dispute, Clay introduced several key bills which were sup-
posed to be addressed individually, but were instead lumped together in what was called the 
Omnibus bill.  First was the inclusion of California as a free state.  California’s admittance ended 
the balance of free states and slave states, and no other territory was to be admitted as a state 
at this time (Utah and New Mexico were simply organized as official territories, and did not be-
come states until 1896 and 1912, respectively).  This imbalance of power put a strain on the 
country’s already weakened sense of unity.  Second was the organization of New Mexico and 
Utah as territories. A residential vote was established to allow the people to decide whether 
they approved of slavery or not in their territory.  Third was the disallowing of the slave trade in 
D.C., though the actual ownership of slaves was perfectly legal.  The other elements of the bill 
included a stricter Fugitive Slave Act, an amended version of Texas’ borders, and a clause which 
would prevent the federal government from interfering with interstate slave trade, i.e. transac-
tions between two slave states, not free to slave or vice versa.    
Clay’s penchant for protecting the Union, at least in its physical form, had always been 
paramount, so why introduce a bill which immediately threw the states into an imbalance?  It is 
in this decision that we see perhaps one of the three aforementioned aspects of Clay’s philoso-
phy taking precedence, i.e., popular sovereignty.  It is at this point that we see Clay’s political 
philosophy is at its essence, rooted in the power of the people.  We see this in the inclusion of a 
popular vote, and in the enforcement of a stricter Fugitive Slave Act.  Clay’s ideology was not 
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rooted in some deep sense of morality or racial equality, but instead in the right of the majority, 
and its inherent defense of the Constitution.  Furthermore, it was in the name of the people 
that he pursued the passage of this bill, despite its initial failure to pass in July of 1850, until he 
grew ill and was forced to resign.  The bill eventually was passed, one part at a time, by Stephen 
A. Douglas, after Clay left office.  Clay died of tuberculosis 1852 in Washington D.C. 
 Clay’s ideology was rooted in the Constitution, his perception of “the people,” and 
preservation of the Union, but each compromise Clay made seemed to favor one element over 
another.  Thus a study to trace how he develops his ideology must include all three aspects of 
his political ideology, and they must be put into the context of his greatest political achieve-
ments.  It is the hope of this project to understand and express clearly the aspects, implications, 
and foundation of Henry Clay’s political ideology to further the study of nineteenth century in-
tellectual and political history.  
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1. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL SOUL OF HENRY CLAY 
After the war of 1812, Henry Clay, a lawyer and representative from Kentucky, believed 
the United States was facing an identity crisis.1  This identity crisis, according to Clay, was a re-
sult of the inability to unite and protect American interests.  Clay spoke on the floor of the 
House of Representatives with great vigor and eloquence, as was his custom and according to 
his reputation as a great orator, about America’s dilemma.  Clay spoke of increasing the size of 
the army and raising taxes to allow the government to pay for these trained soldiers.  Further-
more, Clay sought to create a program which would mean stability, protection, and unity of 
America’s economic and militaristic interests across all of the states. For the first time in a 
speech, Henry Clay used the phrase, “internal improvement.”2 Clay was adamant that internal 
improvements were the only sure way to protect American ventures and maintain a modern 
democratic state.   
Historians have tried to understand this identity crisis and the resulting attempts to fix 
it, pointing to specific events and their effectiveness.  Sean Wilentz argues that the American 
System was Clay’s attempt to gain federal aid for the west, calling Clay skilled but arrogant and 
a consummate politician.  For Wilentz, the creation of the American system was a self-serving, 
political move, and not a bi-partisan, ideological one.3  In contrast, Whig historian Daniel Walker 
Howe describes the American System as the “most systematic and multi-faceted” program in 
                                                          
1
 Henry Clay, “Speech on the Direct Tax Public Affairs,” in The Papers of Henry Clay,[hereafter PHC] 12 Vols, ed. 
James F. Hopkins. (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1961), 2:157. 
 
2
Ibid. 
 
3
Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 243. 
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United States history.4 Howe also states that Clay’s system was founded on ideological princi-
ples, Whig political principles.  In this light, How is correct, but I cannot concur with his source.  
The American System was introduced by Clay as an expression of his own ideals, not that of a 
party, particularly a party that failed, more often than not, to maintain a uniform philosophical 
stance, particularly in relation to Clay’s American System.5 
The changes the country underwent during the early nineteenth century were econom-
ic, militaristic, social, and political changes, but, to focus on the changes themselves and the 
legislation as independent entities is to remove the human element.  Legislation and reform do 
not exist outside of human influence and require a creator.  It is the intent of this chapter to 
illustrate how Henry Clay’s legislation and his ideas cannot be separated from one another, that 
is to say, that his American system was more about fulfilling his ideological principles than 
about filling a ballot box.   
The American system was introduced in 1816 by Henry Clay of Kentucky, and supported 
by several politically important Democratic-Republicans like John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, 
Daniel Webster and John Quincy Adams, both from Massachusetts.  The American System was 
rooted in Alexander Hamilton’s American School or National System.  Hamilton created the 
concept as an intended subversion of the free-trade, laissez-faire "British System."  The systems 
were meant to create higher tariffs on imported goods to protect fledgling American manufac-
                                                          
4
 Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: University of Chicago: 1979), 137. 
 
5
 Michael F. Holt, Political Parties and American Political Development: From the Age of Jackson to the Age of Lin-
coln (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 37-38.  At this point, Clay was actually a member of the 
old Republican party, the supposed party of Jeffersonianism. However, the American System and its inherent 
abandonment of Republican ideals, like laissez faire economics, fragmented the party beyond repair. 
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turing and industry.6   Furthermore, the systems, both Hamilton’s and Clay’s American System, 
included the creation of subsidized roads and canal systems.  Building roads and canals that 
connected major markets across the eastern sea board allowed interstate trading to and na-
tional manufacturing to become a dominant part of the national economy, as opposed to inter-
national trade with well-established manufacturing countries like England and France. The last 
part of each system was the formulation of a National Bank, a point of contention and intrigue 
for Clay and his relationship with Democratic leaders.7 
Alexander Hamilton’s system was designed purely for economic purposes.  Hamilton’s 
system promoted manufacturing and economic independence from foreign dominance, i.e. 
England.  Furthermore, his system was rooted in sustained national, centralized power, and he 
left little room to compromise on the issue.8  Although there are legislative differences between 
the two plans, like economic bounties and manufacturing subsidies in Hamilton’s plan versus 
high tariffs in the Democratic-Republican plans, it is the ideological underpinning of Clay’s plan 
that is most important to this particular study.9   
                                                          
6  
A solid comparison between Clay’s American system and its predecessor, the National System, by Alexander 
Hamilton; Robert C. Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989: Classic Speeches, 1830-1993, (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1994), 79.  For a thorough explanation of the necessity for internal improvements, see Henry Clay, 
“Speech on the Direct Tax Public Affairs,” in The Papers of Henry Clay, Vol 2, pp156-157.    
 
7
 Henry Clay, “Speech on the National Bank- June 3, 1816” in PHC, 12 Vols, ed. James F. Hopkins. (Lexington: Uni-
versity of Kentucky, 1961), 2:202. 
 
8
Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (New York: Penguin Group, 2004), 303. 
 
9
John Lauritz Larson, “‘Bind the Republic Together’: The National Union and the Struggle for a System of Internal 
Improvements,” The Journal of American History 74 (1987): 364- 365.  Another important distinction was that 
Hamilton intended the federal government to “lead from the center,” but Clay’s system required heavy state in-
volvement, if not direct allowance of any improvements that would affect said state. 
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Clay’s introduction of a nationalist, pro-centralized system like the American System is, 
at least on the surface, paradoxical.  In Clay’s early political career in Kentucky, his allegiance to 
Jeffersonianism and the Democratic-Republican party was unquestionably deep: he spoke often 
against noted Federalists such as John Adams, as he disliked Adams both politically and person-
ally.10  But how did Clay assuaged his plan and his seemingly contrary ideology in the late 
1810s?  Clay identified with the Democratic-Republican party, but more specifically, with the 
“nationalistic” Republicans.  This distinction is important to understanding how Clay differed 
from Hamilton, but still justified increased nationalism and centrality. 
By analyzing Henry Clay’s internal improvement legislation and speeches, patterns start 
to emerge.  Three things appear with great frequency when reading Clay’s works on the subject 
of internal improvements.  First is the concept of unity.  Henry Clay’s initial defense for raising 
taxes, creating tariffs, and developing infrastructure for the country’s economic benefit was 
most notably tinged with language of unity and cohesion.11  Clay’s anti-sectionalism approach, 
however, was not without opposition as many Americans by 1820 had grown wary of centrali-
zation.12  Congressional opponents to Clay’s call for national infrastructure cited the perceived 
lack of power of the federal government as granted by the Constitution.   
                                                          
10 Henry Clay, “To Horace Holley - December 19, 1818," in PHC, 12 Vols, ed. James F. Hopkins. (Lexington: Universi-
ty of Kentucky, 1961), 2:614. 
 
11 Henry Clay, “Speech on the Direct Tax Public Affairs,” 2:153. Clay references the unifying force of a larger mili-
tary when it is supported by the country as a whole.  Furthermore, unified countries are stalwarts in the face of 
adversity; Ibid., 157.  Clay believed that economics and a road/canal program will not only physically connect and 
“facilitate intercourse between all parts of the country,” but it would also bind them together in mentality and 
general interest for the country as a whole.   
 
12
 David and Jeanne Heidler, Henry Clay: The Essential American (New York: Random House, 2010), 162. 
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This debate over the supposed powers of the federal government is the second aspect 
of Clay’s political philosophy: his personal interpretation of the Constitution and the implied 
powers of the document.  Clay maintained that the Constitution and its amendments granted 
the federal government the necessary power to create such large federal programs.  In fact, 
Clay believed that the Constitution required them to create such programs, as the Constitution 
was not a list of approved and disapproved powers, but of responsibilities for the government, 
the state, and its people.  These unforeseen responsibilities and powers are what Clay would 
come to call, “incidental powers.”13   
The third and final aspect of note within Clay’s philosophical defense of American infra-
structure was popular sovereignty, i.e. the power of the people to participate in politics.  Henry 
Clay saw internal improvements not only as a means of encouraging economic growth, but to 
increase the availability of the government for the people, and in turn, the people could more 
readily watch and participate in the national political discourse.  This is particularly interesting 
because Clay’s plan requires a strong national government, yet the system implied that states 
and individuals would benefit from the plan and maintain reasonable autonomy, two ideas that 
are in stark contrast.   
Popular sovereignty, Constitutional interpretation, and strengthening of the Union are 
keys to understanding that Clay’s political philosophy is deeply entrenched in his internal im-
provement legislation.  He believed in its unique and progressive nature so much so that Clay 
                                                          
13
Henry Clay, “Speech on Internal Improvements - March 13, 1818," in PHC, 12 Vols, ed. James F. Hopkins. (Lexing-
ton: University of Kentucky, 1961), 2:473. 
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called it the American System.  The American system was, according to Clay, a modern interpre-
tation of power and rights for a modern world.  The American system depicted Clay as a mod-
ern man with progressive ideas. Furthermore, these ideas were not necessarily contrary to 
those of the 1787 Constitutional convention, but updated for a more democratic, liberal socie-
ty. Internal improvements would be forever tied to Clay and his career as a politician and it gar-
nered him both praise and damnation.14   
The first element that Henry Clay introduced was the creation of a tariff and a direct tax 
system.  On January 29, 1816, Clay delivered a speech in rebuttal to Benjamin Hardin, a fellow 
Representative from Kentucky, who wished to amend Clay’s proposed bill.  Hardin disapproved 
of a direct tax, fearing the power and influence that would almost certainly corrupt due to the 
extra cash flow into the capital.  Clay responded by talking up the debt which had accrued dur-
ing the War of 1812, a war he supported with great enthusiasm.  Furthermore, Clay believed 
that a direct tax was the only way to pay off previous debt, as the country was still in debt from 
the war for independence, as well as campaigns in Tripoli and Algiers.  However, Clay illustrated 
his actual reasoning for creating a direct tax was not inherently to pay down the debt.  America 
had, in fact, paid nearly half of its debt up to this point, shrinking from over $78 million in 1802 
to a commendable $45 million by 1815.  Clay introduced another aspect to his improvements 
plan by suggesting that the nation maintain a standing army and navy to protect interests both 
at home and abroad. The direct tax would be a way to pay for the training and maintaining of 
                                                          
14
Ibid., 2:470. 
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professional soldiers, and work the debt down even further.  Clay’s bill passed without Hardin’s 
proposed amendment and the direct tax was to go into effect on January 1, 1817.15   
Clay’s choice of words to defend his tax system and the tariff, his first step toward inter-
nal improvements, tell us a great deal about his political philosophy.  Clay defended his bill, and 
in a somewhat indirect way he defended his stance on the War of 1812, by recalling his being 
near the Battle of Waterloo.  Clay stated, “[There are] some lessons I did derive from [Water-
loo]: but they were lessons which satisfied me that national independence was only to be main-
tained by national resistance against foreign encroachments; by cherishing the interests of the 
people, and giving to the whole physical power of the country an interest in the preservation of 
the nation.”16  What Clay defended was not the direct tax as an institution, but as a means to an 
end.  
 For Clay, the direct tax and the standing army were a way to protect the country’s in-
terests and its liberties from despots and foreign influence.  His reasoning was firmly rooted in a 
form nationalism which manifested itself for Clay in the form of a created spirit of hegemony.  
The war of 1812 was divisive and the lack of a standing army made the nation devoid of any 
tangible icon of patriotism and national unity.  In a sort of ideological throwback to the revolu-
tionary period, Clay’s ideas were founded on requiring each citizen to participate in the gov-
ernment and in a process of improving the nation, even if only in economic terms, through a tax 
in which they could see direct effects, i.e. a physical army or improved roads.  Clay believed that 
                                                          
15
  Henry Clay, “Speech on the Direct Tax Public Affairs,” in PHC, 2: 150.  
 
16
Ibid.  Clay was near Waterloo because he was working with, then Secretary of State, John Q. Adams on the Treaty 
of Ghent, which ended the War of 1812 with England. 
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the War of 1812 was just as necessary as the Revolution, and furthermore that every citizen 
benefitted from the wars’ outcomes.  If they benefitted, then a direct tax as a way for the peo-
ple to play a role in the country and the national well-being was small price to pay.   
Clay distinguished himself from previous improvement plan creators with the infusion of 
popular sovereignty in his defense of a new tax system and a tariff.17  However the interesting 
aspect to his popular sovereignty ideology was that it slowly built up to a more concrete mani-
festation in this speech.  Clay’s initial defense for his bill was that it was way of protecting citi-
zens “by cherishing the interests of the people,” which essentially meant that the people did 
not have the means nor the power to do protect themselves or their interests.  An initial as-
sessment of this statement might appear to be tinged with paternalism, suggesting that the 
government should interfere and protect the citizens like a father does his child.  However, 
Clay’s idea here was not inherently opposed to the power of the people, and did not suggest 
the government act as a shepherd toward its flock, i.e. its citizens. After all, Clay was not for an 
invasive federal government with little restraint and even less morality.   Instead, Clay’s words 
appear to be a precursor to a very modern understanding of the role of government.  Clay was 
the forerunner to Abraham Lincoln’s ideology on government involvement.  Lincoln’s most fa-
mous quote on the matter, though often misquoted, is a sound representation of Clay’s own 
ideology.  Lincoln stated, “in all that the people can individually do as well for themselves, the 
government ought not to interfere.”18 Clay believed the government to be a tool, which was to 
                                                          
17 Ibid., 141. 
 
18
 Ralph Y. McGinnis, Quotations from Abraham Lincoln, (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1977), 41.  The interesting connec-
tion between Lincoln and Clay is not all that hard to believe, as Lincoln was a life-long admirer of Clay and even 
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be used by the people to improve the economic and political landscape. Therefore, creating an 
economic climate in which all individuals could participate equally was of the utmost im-
portance.  Clay, in most respects, wanted an economic model based less on agriculture, though 
not devoid of it and thus lacking self-reliance, but strongly supported manufacturing.19  Clay be-
lieved that strong manufacturing was the way of the future.  
In order for America to prosper and become an economic power in the greater world’s 
economy, manufacturing and the development of America’s vast raw materials were essential.  
But the reason for manufacturing was not only about competing with England, but about self-
sufficiency, which for Clay, meant economic power to America and the people.  America relied, 
according to Clay, far too much on foreign goods at the expense of domestic markets.  Clay’s 
empowered rant against foreign markets began with “Dame commerce will oppose domestic 
manufactures.  She is flirty, flippant, noisy jade, and if we are governed by her fantasies, we 
shall never put off the muslins of India and the cloths of Europe.”20  The defense for manufac-
turing then was twofold: protection of America industry; and to lay “this solid foundation of the 
national prosperity.”  This cry to protect prosperity came to Clay’s office in the form of numer-
ous petitions from major markets in New York, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, among 
others, which pleaded with Congress to protect the home industry.  Thus he defended the need 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
gave a eulogy in Springfield upon news of Clay’s death in 1752.  The lone difference is that Clay’s words seem to 
imply the right of government action and governmental interpretation of the wants of the people, while Lincoln’s 
words suggest a certain amount of governmental removal from the everyday workings of the citizenry. 
 
19
 Maurice G. Baxter, Henry Clay and the American System (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1995), 27. 
 
20 Heidler, 78.  Muslin is a loosely woven fabric made in India and was marketed by the British across Europe and 
into the New World.  It was an expensive fabric made out of Indian and Middle Eastern cotton. 
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for a tariff and a new tax system, which encouraged manufacturing and urban factories, and 
according to Clay, “was sensitive to the wants and sufferings of the people.”21  In this way, Clay 
still placed the people at the top of the power structure by depicting Congress’ primary function 
as defending and bringing to fruition the people’s wants. 
The opponents to the American System’s tariff and tax system were primarily the Deep 
South and the West, Clay’s home constituency.  Southern cotton plantation owners, along with 
Western farmers, were afraid that tariffs on imports will directly affect their trade with England 
and France.  Cotton industries in the South and the Wheat of the West were already in high 
demand, selling not only to the North but to several western European countries.  Clay’s be-
lieved that citizens within a country as fellow societal members were a part of a greater whole.  
Furthermore, Clay thought “mutual concession” and the promotion of the “fabrication” of soci-
ety in America were beneficial and would improve not just New England, but the entire coun-
try’s circumstances.22 Thus Clay’s defense for manufacturing and his retort to his adversaries 
was founded heavily on the notion of the power of the people and again noticeable unifying 
language. 
The final element of Clay’s philosophy as noted with the language surrounding Clay’s 
proposed tariff, was how he interpreted the Constitution and what power the government was 
allotted.  Although he referenced the Constitution only once in his initial January 1816 speech 
on the direct tax, Clay’s perspective of the Constitution is in full view in a speech given two 
                                                          
21 Henry Clay, “Speech on Internal Improvements - March 13, 1818," in PHC, 12 Vols, ed. James F. Hopkins. (Lexing-
ton: University of Kentucky, 1961), 2: 845. 
 
22 Ibid., 2:833. 
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years later entitled, “Speech on Internal Improvements.” The effects of a tariff on local manu-
facturing and trade were positive for Clay as he assumed a tariff would mean a domestically fo-
cused economic policy rather than allowing the country to continue having international trade 
makeup the majority of its economy.  The internal improvements speech, however, was less 
about the tariff and other proposed elements of the American system, but rather about the 
Constitution and the powers granted and not granted to the federal government.23 
Clay’s speech was a response to a report to the Virginia legislature given by former pres-
ident James Madison.  The fact that Clay was willing to confront such a political juggernaut 
speaks to Clay’s convictions about the role of the Constitution.  Clay believed what all American 
politicians did, that the Constitution had two types of powers: implied and expressed powers.  
However, Madison’s report suggested that the implied power must only be “necessary and 
proper” to be enacted, an almost textbook summarizing of the Constitution’s own words.  Clay, 
however, demanded that the interpretation of the Constitution must change with the times.  
Therefore, a more modern world required a more modern translation.  Clay added the words 
“absolutely necessary” and inferred that the federal government had a responsibility to use 
these powers.  This type of implied power Clay would later call “incidental power.”   
Clay’s detractors disagreed vehemently and argued for the rights of the states, as they 
believed that Clay’s incidental powers would allow too much power at the federal level, there-
by undermining state and local governments.  Clay, however, despised the state’s rights argu-
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ment, calling it “abusive, if not dangerous’ which could lead to unforeseen consequences.24  
The tariff would pass in 1816 and then another set of tariffs again in 1820.  Neither set of tariffs 
was satisfactory for Clay as their protection was limited to lower rates than Clay envisioned.  
But the tariffs did pass, and at this stage in his young career, that was a victory for him and his 
political philosophy of internal improvements.25    
The second aspect to Clay’s American System is the creation of a system of roads and 
canals.  The creation of these roads and canals was directly tied to the development of manu-
facturing, as a better system of roads and canals would allow for safer, more efficient passage 
of raw goods to already established factories, and would more than likely encourage wide-
spread growth of manufacturing well into the South and the West.26  The need for federally 
funded roads and canals was great, according to Clay. A road system would have economic 
benefits by “distributing private enterprise,” it would also increase national patronage and co-
hesion, but still allow the states to have a direct line of power as Clay offered “joint-
cooperation” on internal improvements.27 
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The initial bill on developing roads and canals was not the brain child of Henry Clay.  
Hamilton included it in his plan, though he was only able to execute it under the guise that the 
government had the right to create roads for the military or for postal workers.  James Madi-
son’s Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin introduced an economic plan in 1808 which in-
cluded a road system and a set of canals along northern rivers.  The plan was fully endorsed by 
the likes of Clay and Calhoun of course, but it failed to come to fruition.  It was volleyed back 
and forth for years, until Madison vetoed it on his way out of office in 1816.28  Nevertheless, 
Calhoun and Clay introduced new legislation, which was decidedly less ambitious than initial 
attempts at improvements. 
The new plan was simply to encourage the creation of a fund which would be used by 
the states for the development of roads and canals, hence “joint cooperation.”  Clay reiterated 
his nationalist sentiments, proclaiming that it would facilitate interstate trade and national pat-
ronage, thereby limiting sectionalism, at least to some degree.  But what is most interesting 
was how Clay again set up a power structure where the citizens were at the top as seen by 
granting the states the final voice in where the roads specifically would be built.  So not only did 
Clay continue his dialogue of nationalism, but also seemed to keep hinting at imploring the 
government to acquiesce to the people.  In a speech given on March 7, 1818, Clay placed “per-
sonal freedom” as the standard by which all legislation should be measured.  Any failure to 
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comply, or legislation that denied, risked, or abused personal liberties and freedoms, was not 
only to be avoided, but struck down with severe consequences.29 
The question of Constitutionality and governmental right to expand the federal govern-
ment was a large debate with internal improvements.  In fact, it was the fundamental differ-
ence between previous attempts at improvements.  For example, Thomas Jefferson and other 
strict constructionists warned that if it was not expressed in the Constitution, then an amend-
ment was necessary.30   
The government in the United States was established, according to Clay, for the benefit 
of the people, and the powers given to them are not so much powers as they were “duties.”  
Thus for Clay, improvements were not an expansion of governmental power, but a fulfillment 
of government “patronizing” its citizens to improve “national character and resources.”31  Clay 
defended his position with the precision of a surgeon and the ferocity and passion of a zealot.  
Clay debated semantics, going so far as to debate the meaning of the word “establish,” alt-
hough the definition Clay used was important to his perspective of the Constitution.32  Clay par-
layed his “establish” debate into a larger argument in which he summarized his perspective of 
federal power as granted by the Constitution succinctly when he stated:  
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[Alexander Smyth-Va.] considers every thing gained to the states from the gen-
eral government as something snatched from a foreign power.  I consider it as a 
government co-ordinate with them, and the true construction, I think, is to give 
to it all that vigor and vitality which rightfully belong to it.33 
 
This was yet another example of combined governmental power, requiring as much 
state involvement as he does federal.  However, the continued debate over the Constitutional 
right of government to create roads and canals, even for future military or postal service was 
hotly contested.  Nevertheless, Clay’s perspective of the Constitution cannot be clearer than it 
was illustrated in that March 7 speech.  The Constitution according to Clay was not about just 
power, or holding dominion over the states.  It was a matter of co-operation and integrated 
powers for the betterment of not 21 sovereign states, but of the entire nation as a whole. 
Clay also tried to illustrate the right of the federal government to create roads by creat-
ing an example of precedent.  He stated that granting the federal government the “incidental 
power” to create roads and canals was not contrary to the power of the states, citing the Cum-
berland road agreement reached between Thomas Jefferson as president and the state of 
Ohio.34  The power was granted to the federal government for the road due in large part to the 
state’s consent.  In the case of the Cumberland road, the federal government erected the road 
by receiving a compact with Ohio and the states it went through.  Therefore, Clay felt he had 
made a compelling argument which proved that not only does the federal government have the 
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power for internal improvements within the Constitution, even if only by means of an “inci-
dental power,” but that it was not contrary to the states own desires and rights.35   
After he felt the argument was won, Clay urged his fellow Congressmen to suspend their 
uncertainty and to: 
[expediently exercise] their existing powers, and, where necessary, of resorting 
to the prescribed model of enlarging them, in order to effectuate a comprehen-
sive system of [internal improvements], such as will have the effect of drawing 
more closely together every part of our country, by promoting intercourse and 
improvements, and by increasing the share of every part in the common stock of 
national prosperity.36   
  
In short, Clay believed that the federal government had the right via the Constitution and the 
responsibility toward the people and the nation to push internal improvements through.   
Clay believed the development of an infrastructure as a means to encourage national-
ism and to increase the power and role of the people in the everyday workings of the govern-
ment.  Clay’s stance on the role of government and with whom the true power rested is most 
clear at the end of his Direct Tax speech, when his adherence to popular sovereignty and his 
belief in the role of internal improvements is fully manifested in a few short words:  “Let us ful-
fill the just expectations of the public whose eyes are anxiously directed towards this session of 
Congress.”  Clay believed that not only should the government create an internal improvements 
act, i.e. the American System, but that it as the federal body had a responsibility to do so, that 
is, they had “expectations” to meet.  Clay wrapped up his speech as he urged his fellow mem-
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bers of Congress to remember their obligations and that the greatest reward they as represent-
atives can receive for fulfilling their obligation was when they return home to grateful exclama-
tion and praises of the people saying, “Well done thou good and faithful servant.”  Clay’s final 
statement fully implied a role of servitude, thus placing the people as the source of power and 
approval, while the government should be content with having done what the people have 
asked of them and nothing more.37  
Clay’s political ideology of national unity, popular sovereignty, and modern Constitu-
tional interpretation set the stage for the first two parts of his American system: the tax and 
tariff; and a road/canal system.  Clay’s legislative embodiment of his own political ideology was 
taking hold across the country.  Although Clay’s American System was never embraced by the 
nation as he wished and  it would take a back seat to the most dominant and polarizing issue of 
Henry Clay’s career and of the second party system: slavery.  Clay attempted to keep the im-
provements program relevant during the 1820s and 1830s, but even he realized that slavery 
was the issue that most clearly threatened the Union, an issue that was paramount to Clay’s 
political philosophy. Nevertheless, the American System provided a coherent governing philos-
ophy that informed Clay in his opinions on the role of the government, the power of the peo-
ple, and how to address slavery.  
 
 
2. HENRY CLAY ON SLAVERY 
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Many works of historical analysis have enumerated the political philosophy of Henry 
Clay on topics varying from foreign relations to states’ rights.  The statesman from Kentucky has 
left indelible marks on U.S. Constitutional and legislative history, but Clay’s political and philo-
sophical stance on the subject of slavery has been left unfairly examined.  In the early nine-
teenth century, Clay was among the most powerful and influential men in the country, and he 
had already developed a reputation as a man of intellect and reasonableness, earning the nick-
name, “The Great Compromiser.”  Clay, like any politician of his day, had his share of unrelent-
ing enemies in the opposing Democratic party of Jackson.  Further, Clay had numerous out-
spoken friends and colleagues within his own Whig party, particularly when the issue of slavery 
was the topic of mention.  Both parties would push and pull, prod and poke, flatter him inces-
santly or threaten defamation, all as a means to sway Clay toward either pro-slavery or aboli-
tionism.   
Abolitionists in the early nineteenth century depicted Clay as a hypocrite: Clay always 
opposed slavery in principle but still owned fifty slaves to maintain his family estate, Ashland, in 
Kentucky. Clay’s southern, slave-holding Whig brethren and his staunch southern Democrat op-
ponents in the House of Representatives and the Senate shared the abolitionists’ sentiment of 
Clay as a hypocrite.  They belittled Clay’s judgment, citing his ownership of slaves but openness 
to admitting abolitionist petitions on the Congressional floor and opposition to Congressional 
gag orders.  Pro-slavery supporters, particularly those in the Democratic party, sought to un-
dermine Clay because of his abolitionist sympathies.  Either way, both parties depicted Clay, at 
times, as a man of hypocritical principles that placed him in the “no man’s land” of nineteenth 
century American politics: between abolitionism and pro-slavery.  
24 
 
 
 
Modern accounts of Clay’s understanding of slavery are similar in structure to either the 
Whig or Democratic viewpoints.  Those who choose a less than favorable light, such as noted 
Democratic party historian Sean Wilentz, depict Clay as a hypocritical politician who “alienated” 
his fellow party members and undermined supporters.38  Other historians present Clay as a 
man who “opposed slavery as an institution, [but] accepted the evil as a matter of practical 
business.”39  Even twenty-first century supporters like Whigophile historian Daniel Walker 
Howe fail to capture the truest essence of Clay’s stance on slavery.  These historians, antagonis-
tic or otherwise, fail to see the fundamental principle of Clay’s political policies.   
Henry Clay’s political position on slavery changed over time. In his early years Clay led a 
liberal crusade against slavery and its expansion.  After a failure to sway slave holders within his 
home state of Kentucky of their perpetuation of slavery as an evil, Clay called for gradual eman-
cipation and colonization hoping to bridge the ever-increasing gap between pro-slavery and ul-
tra-abolitionist contingencies.  Later in Clay’s life, as a presidential candidate and elder states-
men, he developed a more tempered and conciliatory approach, but he repeatedly attempted 
to consolidate the opposing sides, whether Whig, Democrat, Northern or Southern.   
As antagonism between the North and South grew, Clay’s disapproval of slavery was 
further and further superseded by his commitment to the integrity and prosperity of the Union.  
It is undeniable that Clay chose his public stance carefully and designed it, at least at times, to 
ensure his political and economic well-being.  However, the superficial fluidity of Clay’s stance 
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on slavery, among other political issues, was always founded upon one primary principle: to 
maintain the stability, order, and integrity of the Union and the Constitution. 
In 1792, an assistantship in the offices of the Chancery opened up and Clay was chosen 
to fill it.  Here Clay showed a natural propensity toward law and its application.  The following 
year, at the age of 16, Clay would garner the attention of Virginia Chancellor George Wythe, a 
master lawyer and influential figure in both Virginian and national affairs.40  Wythe had already 
made a name for himself as a teacher and jurist, his list of students including John Marshall, the 
fourth chief justice of the United States Supreme Court, and Thomas Jefferson, noted Virginia 
statesman, lawyer, and writer of the Declaration of Independence.41  Under Wythe, Clay was 
formally educated as a lawyer, and he developed an intellectual curiosity for all things practical 
and pragmatic.  Although the use of Wythe’s library and knowledge of litigation were important 
to the formation of Clay’s professional career, it was George Wythe’s example as a man of prin-
ciple and compassion that formed Clay’s moral outlook and his initial understanding of slav-
ery.42 
George Wythe, a learned man, taught that morality was the foundation of liberty for all 
men.  Compared to the ancient Greek Aristides by his peers, Wythe sought justice and equality 
for all men, including slaves, which he did own for a time.43  Wythe saw the discontinuity be-
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tween a land designed for liberty and the ownership of another human being.  Slavery was con-
trary to the natural and inalienable rights that he had taught to Jefferson, who so eloquently 
penned them into the Declaration. The continued existence of slavery would, in Wythe’s own 
words, “soil the grand quest for human freedom.”44  In response to his conclusions, Wythe 
adopted abolitionist philosophies and freed his slaves not upon his death, but upon their finish-
ing apprenticeships with him.  The young Henry Clay watched as his mentor taught slaves to 
read and write or trained them in a vocational skill.  Clay came to accept Wythe’s perspective of 
slavery as a “blight” upon mankind and a terrible hypocrisy in America.  This realization became 
the foundation of Henry Clay’s moral stance against slavery.45  In later years, Clay praised 
Wythe, saying, “No man was I more indebted to, by his instruction, his advice, and his exam-
ple.” Furthermore, Henry Clay claimed that he learned more under the tutelage of George 
Wythe in Richmond, Viriginia, than he did in the remainder of his life elsewhere.46  
The importance of Wythe and his inevitable influence on Clay cannot be overstated.  
Under Wythe, Clay learned invaluable ideas that he would later implement while in office.  First 
is the importance of education, not only for free men but for all men, slaves included.  Like 
Wythe, Clay educated his slaves, teaching several to read and write, including signing their own 
name.  Clay also learned the practice of gradual and merit-based emancipation.  Wythe eman-
cipated his slaves once they were prepared for the world which the white slave trade forced 
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them into.47  Clay’s ownership of slaves followed a similar vein, and he spent nearly all of his life 
after leaving Richmond trying to convince other slave holders to do the same.  He would ask 
them to treat their slaves fairly and humanely and eventually, to emancipate them, even if at 
their own pace.   
In 1797, days after Clay received his law license, Clay made the decision to move away 
from Virginia.  Virginia had an over-abundance of young lawyers and politicians, and Clay real-
ized the development of a prosperous law firm would be slow and arduous.  Afraid of being lost 
in the swarm of youthful lawyers, Clay moved to Kentucky near Lexington to begin his law ca-
reer.  With his penchant for discussion and his idealism at the ready, Clay joined the political 
and professional ranks of the Kentucky elite in Lexington.  It would not take long for Clay and 
his natural proficiency with the law to develop a reputation for quality litigation and sound 
morals.  Henry Clay earned respect in the community as someone who fought for the “little 
man.”  His appeal to ordinary citizens helped him form a constituency that would last for nearly 
half a century.48  
The political climate of Kentucky in the late 1790s and early 1800s was calm by revolu-
tionary standards, but the discussion of slavery was an issue of great import to both Federalist 
and Republican parties in the state.  On April 16, 1798, Henry Clay published the first of several 
essays to come under the pseudonym “Scaevola” in the Kentucky Gazette.  The essay attacked 
the issue of slavery directly, calling for revisions to the state Constitution and gradual emanci-
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pation.  Addressed to the electors of Fayette County, Clay’s essay attempted to evoke their 
emotions and appeal to their moral sensitivities, asking, “Can any humane man be happy and 
contented when he sees near thirty-thousand of his fellow beings around him, deprived of all 
the rights which make life desirable, transferred like cattle from the possession of one to an-
other...when he hears the piercing cries of husbands separated from wives and children from 
parents?”49  Clay’s liberal, idealistic cries for emancipation earned him little respect among the 
older generations and the established statesmen of Kentucky.  Members of the Kentucky lower 
house and state legislature, like John Breckinridge, branded Clay and those with abolitionist 
sympathies “dreamers ”or “beardless boys” and would align them with land redistributionists.  
Clay and his supporters were outnumbered, and conservative voices won the argument in the 
Kentucky General Assembly, but Clay had established himself as a man of principle and back-
bone, and, at least at this moment, as an abolitionist.50  
In spite of all the negative publicity the “Scaevola” essays garnered Clay, he was elected 
to the Kentucky General Assembly in 1803.  While in the General Assembly as a representative 
for Fayette County, Clay continued to argue the positives of emancipation while tempering his 
opponent’s reactions by stating his disapproval of immediate emancipation.  He cited the nega-
tive effects immediate emancipation would have on both the slaves and the poorer farmers of 
Kentucky.  Instead, Clay called for gradual emancipation and proposed a colonization program 
for the state of Kentucky to send freed slaves back to Africa.  Clay had always advocated that 
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slavery was an absolute evil and that America must rid itself of slavery before it was so en-
trenched that there would be no removing it at all.51  He saw negative political effects, noting 
the unbalanced political and economic power of slave holders within the state of Kentucky, and 
he assumed this was true across the South.  Clay wanted slavery to end, and it was as much a 
part of his public and political ideology as it was a part of his private morality, but Clay had to 
temper his personal feelings toward slavery and participate in the political balancing act that he 
would come to master in time. 
  Clay’s political career and his recognition as a pragmatic orator continued to blossom.  
In December 1806, Clay earned the resigned Senate seat of John Breckinridge, the very man 
who accused Clay in 1798 of being an abolitionist and a land redistributionist.  Clay’s first ses-
sion in the U.S. Senate lasted less than a year, and he returned home to Kentucky.  Not one to 
rest long, Clay was elected speaker of the Kentucky House of Representatives in 1807.  Clay 
made another short appearance in the Senate in 1810, but his national political career fully de-
veloped in 1811, when he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. 
By 1811 the United States was dealing with national and foreign relations issues.  The 
proposed creation of the Second National Bank, the coming war with Britain, and slavery were 
all polarizing issues that were reaching critical levels across the country.  In November of 1811, 
Henry Clay was elected to the House of Representatives and won the speakership; Clay became 
the first man to be nominated and chosen as Speaker of the House on his first day as a Repre-
sentative.  Clay’s years as the Speaker of the House would alter the political landscape of Amer-
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ica and turn the seat into one of prime political importance.52  Spearheading the “War Hawks” 
of Congress, Clay urged for the commencing of the War of 1812 with Britain, citing economic, 
political, and idealistic reasons.  After the war ended in 1814, Clay served as a dignitary in Brit-
ain, watching over the proceedings in the signing of the Treaty of Ghent.  Upon his return home 
in 1815, Clay used his role as the Speaker of the House to create new legislation and commit-
tees that would change American politics, economics, and alter slavery as Americans had 
known it.53 
In 1816, the American Convention of Delegates from Abolition Societies met, as they 
had done since 1794, to discuss the growing dilemma, both moral and political, of slavery.  The 
Convention decided slaves should be trained and educated well enough to ensure their own 
survival and integration into civilized, white society.  In his youth, Henry Clay probably would 
have applauded such a plan, as it was reminiscent of his mentor and the system of emancipa-
tion Wythe used to free his own slaves.  However, Clay’s democratic ideals had superceded his 
abolitionist sympathies by this time.  Although Clay remained morally appalled by slavery and 
wrestled with the ownership of slaves, the pragmatic side of Clay could not ignore the political 
upheaval that immediate emancipation would cause.  As a means to find an alternative solution 
that would appease slavery and abolitionist contingencies, Clay helped found the American 
Colonization Society on December 21, 1816.  
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The Society was based upon the ideas of New Jersey Presbyterian minister Robert Fin-
ley, noted abolitionist and evangelical crusader.  The ACS established a presidential seat at the 
head of the society.  The founders, Henry Clay, John Randolph, and Richard Bland Lee, each 
served as president, though Clay would not serve as president of the Society until 1836.  After 
forming in 1816, the society spent the next four years earning money by selling memberships.  
The ACS attempted to convince Congress to grant it sums of money, succeeding in 1819, but 
failing numerous times after their initial success.  But with the initial $100,000 grant from Con-
gress and money raised from selling memberships, the ACS sent its first shipload of freed slaves 
back to the west African coast. These freemen, under the guidance of Clay, Lee, Randolph and 
President James Monroe, formed the new colony of Liberia and named its capital Monrovia.  
Over the next 40 years, nearly 13,000 American freed slaves were transported to Africa. 
According to Sean Wilentz, this was the “birth of radical abolitionism” and a “merging of 
contradictory ideas.”54  However, Clay’s understanding of the purpose of the Society was any-
thing but radical or abolitionist.  Clay saw the society as a means to avoid prejudicial tendencies 
of the white race.  Furthermore, the ACS and Liberia would encourage Christianity in Africa, and 
most importantly, could help avoid conflict between slave holders and abolitionists, thereby 
maintaining the Union.55  Clay designed it as a compromise between the abolitionists and the 
slave holders; abolitionists would be able to free a certain number of slaves and return them to 
the “land of their fathers,” and slave owners would be pleased with the reduction of the appar-
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ent threat of revolt by the growing freed black population.56  By this time, radical abolitionists 
of the early republic had abandoned all hope of gradual emancipation.57   The unwillingness to 
accept gradual emancipation as a possibility paints a desperate picture of a country already 
deeply divided and polarized by the issue of slavery.  Instead, radical abolitionism was calling 
for “immediatism.”  Clay was not a proponent of radicalism but was opposed to it.  Clay was 
attempting to form a compromise on the issue of slavery in order to ease rising tensions. 
Historians have labeled Henry Clay as a hypocritical racist for creating the ACS, citing 
part of his speech to the committee of the American Colonization Society.  Clay said of the black 
slaves that they were “the most corrupt, depraved, and abandoned” class of people.  This is 
where most historians end their research, having found what they seek: a polarizing quote from 
a legendary statesman.  However, immediately following those cruel, attention-grabbing words, 
Clay said, “It is not so much their fault, as the consequence of their anomalous condition.  Place 
ourselves, place any men, in the like predicament, and similar effects will follow.  They are not 
slaves, and yet they are not free.  The laws, it is true, proclaim them free; but prejudices, more 
powerful than any laws, deny them the privileges of freemen.”58  The problem was not that 
these black men and women were sub-human or genetically predisposed toward a life of  
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servitude.  Instead, Clay saw that white men and their prejudice were at the root of the slavery 
issue, and thus reconciliation between the races was unlikely.  Therefore, Clay’s ACS was ideal-
istic but certainly not radical abolitionism, nor was it particularly racist for its day.  The ACS was 
Clay’s first attempt at brokering a compromise for the health and well-being of the country. 
Despite the initial success of the ACS in the late 1810s toward compromising on slavery, 
it could not sway, according to Clay, the “extremes of opinion and action, which can unite in 
nothing.”59  When Congress reassembled in January of 1820, Henry Clay and the entire national 
political body were forced to address what had become a steadily growing crisis, the Missouri 
Controversy.  New York Representative James Tallmadge, a well-documented abolitionist, had 
put forth a bill to ban slavery in Missouri despite a number of slaves already residing in the 
state.  Missouri’s admittance as a non-slave state would alter the balance between slave and 
free states, which had been in equilibrium for the first time when Alabama was admitted to the 
Union in December of 1819.60  Illinois Senator Jesse Thomas presented a case for admitting 
Missouri as a slave state only if Maine, which had previously been a part of Massachusetts, 
would be admitted to the Union as a free state.  In addition to these qualifications, Thomas 
suggested that a line be drawn using the latitude 36E 30', the southern border of Missouri.  Any 
new territory or state under jurisdiction of the American government north of that line would 
be free, and any state or territory admitted south of the line could choose slavery.   
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Clay’s political influence was greatly felt during the Missouri crisis.  Clay recalled his role 
in the Compromise: 
Both parties appealed to me; and after surveying their condition I went to work.  
I saw that each was so committed and so wedded to its opinion that nothing 
could be effects, without a compromise; and the point with was to propose 
some compromise which should involve no sacrifice of principle.61 
 
Clay formed the committee which pushed the bill through, and as Clay said, the resultant com-
promise was one of political ideology and not moral principles.  Clay was never willing to allow 
slavery free reign across the country and risk it spreading uncontrollably.  He was also of the 
opinion that slave states surrounded on all sides by non-slave states, or vice versa, could poten-
tially place a burden on the neighboring states.  If a free state were surrounded by slave states, 
the free territory would feel immense political pressure to accept slavery as well or they could 
be overwhelmed by runaway slaves from all sides of the state’s borders.  If a slave state were 
surrounded by free states, a runaway slave might be impossible to reacquire and the political 
pressure to emancipate would be great on the slave state.    
There were two primary reasons Clay politically supported and helped to develop the 
compromise: first was the belief that the federal government had no right to interfere with in-
dividual, pre-existing states and what they and their Constitutions deemed “right and proper.”62  
Secondly, he wanted to protect the integrity of the Union.  When asked to discuss the Missouri 
issue, Clay said, “Never have I seen the Union in such danger.”63  Several Southern states 
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threatened secession during the heated debate of the Missouri Crisis and others warned of civil 
war, but Clay managed to cool tempers at least for a while once the Missouri Compromise 
passed.64  Although Clay wanted a compromise that would not force him to “sacrifice princi-
ples,” the preservation of the Union was always at the forefront of his political endeavor.   
Clay’s career was on an upshot.  His brokered compromise garnered him the title of 
“great compromiser” and his political power and prestige had never been higher.  Clay spent 
the greater part of the 1820s pushing his internal improvements plan the American System, un-
til his lackluster years as Secretary of State from 1825-1829.  His continual pursuit for compro-
mise and Unionism, however, resulted in his being reelected to the Senate in 1831 by his home 
state of Kentucky.  Upon his return to Congress, Clay continued to reiterate his opinion that the 
“General Government” should not touch the matter of slavery in states where it previously ex-
isted.65  All the while pro- and antislavery emotions continued to swell, causing greater unrest.  
Pro-slavery states like South Carolina threatened secession while abolitionists argued harder 
against slavery, calling it “evil,” in both a moral and a political sense.66  Clay continued to argue 
for gradual emancipation in the House and in the Senate, hoping to encourage centrality and 
moderation, but little gain came from his efforts.  As tensions rose, Clay became more concilia-
tory in nature, and he regarded either extreme as unsafe.67   
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When Clay received a letter from a James T. Austin that included a pamphlet written to 
persuade him toward abolitionism, Clay responded to the letter in an amiable but moderate 
manner.  Clay complimented the man on his eloquence and his concise writing style but ques-
tioned Austin’s motives.  Clay stated, “Throw off all restraint, and what is the right of discussion 
[about slavery], exercised beyond the limits of our own State, but the principle of 
propagandism?”68  Clay was arguing for the slavery issue to be handled by the states them-
selves.   He tried to maintain that the federal government had no right to legislate either for or 
against slavery.   
However, the issue would prove larger than Clay had anticipated.  A growing number of 
abolitionist petitions began to find their way to the Senate floor.  Representatives from slave 
states, like South Carolina’s John C. Calhoun, suggested “Congressional gag-orders” for the peti-
tions.  In short, the body would acknowledge the petition’s existence, and then it would be “laid 
on the table,” making it impossible to debate.  Clay was opposed to the gag-orders, citing the 
Constitutional right of each citizen to write their grievances and send them to the Capitol.69 Alt-
hough Clay wanted to reserve the right of discussion to each state, he was not willing to censor 
an individual’s right to be heard on a national platform. Clay’s personal feelings toward the evils 
of slavery were thus secondary in importance to him behind his primary goal of order and sta-
bility in the Union.   
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Historians have argued over Clay’s motives during the 1830s on issues like the growing 
threat of political extremists and civil war.  Clay’s desire for the presidency is undeniable, but 
Clay famously said in an address to the Senate on February 9, 1839, “I would rather be right 
than president.”70  Sean Wilentz describes Clay during these years as a man who “alienated” 
northern abolitionists while placating southern slave holders.  Wilentz concludes that Clay thus 
showed his “moral bankruptcy.”71  A closer look at Clay shows that he was neither alienating 
nor was he morally bankrupt, but rather he was trying to formulate a sense of unity and com-
promise. 
In 1844, Clay wrote a letter to William C. Rives, a member of the House of Representa-
tives.  In the letter, Clay wrote, “I have always believed that the steady and united opposition of 
the South, in former times, to [the tariff of 1842], was the principle cause of abolition.”72 Clay 
placed a great deal of blame on abolitionists and their progressive radicalization.  Clay was still 
a moderate whose goal was not emancipation at any cost, but a strong union rooted in Consti-
tutional law.  Only days later, Clay continued an on-going dialogue with Charles Burchard and 
John J. Foote, men he considered fellow “political friends.”  In this correspondence, they dis-
cussed the evils of slavery and the most prudent way to emancipate while maintaining some 
sense of order and civility.73  A month later, Charles Burchard, a noted abolitionist, wrote to 
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Clay again.  Burchard informed Clay of his intentions to leave the Liberty party, the largest abo-
litionist political party in the United States during the 1840s, and Burchard instead decided to 
support Clay and his approach to gradual emancipation.74  Clay urged both extremes to find a 
way to have a reasonable, intermediate discussion on slavery without the threat of secession.  
Clay finally came to the conclusion that the only way to ensure he could create a system that 
would deal fairly with the states and humanely with the slaves was to gain the presidency.   
Clay had tried for the presidency since 1824. In fact, no one tried harder to win the 
White House during the 1830s and through the 1840s than Henry Clay; he ran in all five elec-
tions during the two decades, from 1832 and his last in 1848.   In his early years, Clay saw the 
presidency as a means to reinforce his American System and protect the National Bank, but by 
the 1836 election, Clay believed the presidency was his best way to help put an end to the slav-
ery issue, though not necessarily to slavery itself.  He wanted the presidency, but he was never 
willing to allow himself to be politically swayed by personal achievement, nor would he cater to 
the partisan extremes.  Clay gave a speech on slavery on February 7, 1839, saying: 
I am, Mr. President, no friend of slavery.  The searcher of all hearts 
knows that every pulsation of mine beats high and strong in the cause of 
civil liberty.  Wherever it is safe and practicable, I desire to see every por- 
tion of the human family in the enjoyment of it.  But I prefer the liberty 
of my own country to that of any other people; and the liberty of my 
own race to that of any other race.75 
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Clay’s defense of liberty is politically savvy, but the important clause in his speech is that 
he would “prefer the liberty of my own country to that of other people.”  Clay is trying to ex-
press to the Senate that the fundamental issue is not slavery itself.  The polarizing and demoral-
izing issue for Clay was the threat of disunion.  Seeing slavery as an inferior issue to disunion, 
Clay was just as opposed to placating abolitionist sympathies as he was to justifying slavery.   
Even within his own party Clay was willing to hold his middle ground.  Clay and fellow 
Whig party member Joshua R. Giddings had been sending correspondence to one another, dis-
cussing the up-coming party nomination for the 1848 presidential election.  Henry Clay was de-
lighted to be asked to run for president again but refused to run on the party’s increasingly abo-
litionist platform.  Giddings asked Clay to consider immediate emancipation of his own slaves in 
Ashland, but Clay firmly declined:   
I regret as much as anyone does the existence of slavery in our country, and wish 
to God there was not a single slave in the United States, or in the whole world.  
But here the unfortunate institution is, and a most delicate and difficult affair is 
it to deal with.  I have during my life emancipated some eight or ten, under cir-
cumstances which appeared to me to admit of their emancipation. 
 
Clay invited Giddings to Ashland to see how he treated his slaves and learn that he took good 
care of them and that most of his slaves would “perish if [Clay] sent them forth in the world,” 
citing old age, sickness, or injury as the reason for him keeping them on his family estate.  Clay 
ended the correspondence succinctly: 
But whatever I may or might do towards them must be wholly independent of all 
political motives or considerations; it must rest exclusively with my own sense of 
duty and propriety.  Nor do I believe that if it were possible for me to be influ-
enced by the motive of my own political advancement in the emancipation of my 
slaves, at this time, it would tend in the smallest degree to the promotion of an 
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end.  My object and purpose would be alike assailed by the ultras on both sides, 
if not by others.76  
 
Clay understood slavery was an evil, but it was a delicate situation that would have disastrous 
consequences if immediate emancipation were forcibly implemented on southern and western 
slave holders.  It would also be foolish to ignore the implications that immediate emancipation 
would have on Clay’s own holdings and slaves, but that was not his reasoning for disavowing 
ultraism.  Out of principle Clay rejected “ultras” from both ends of the spectrum and did so 
without “sacrificing principles,” both personal and political, even though this meant rejecting 
his best hope for attaining the presidency.77   
 Clay’s views on slavery as an institution and as a political issue are clear.  He desired to 
see slavery ended, but only through a moderate, gradual process which would allow for whites 
and blacks to adjust to a new society slowly.  It was in this light that Clay fought so hard to 
maintain the Union and to adhere to the Constitutional powers granted to himself and his legis-
lative colleagues; because nothing would so abruptly end slavery – and the Union- like a civil 
war. Clay refused to allow the United States to become physically fractured, even if its political 
fracturing was already apparent and spreading like a crack in a pane of glass.  Clay’s penchant 
for union and compromise would be needed again, particularly in the Nullification Crisis of 1833 
when slavery and the American System came to a head and only one would truly survive the 
impending compromise. 
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3. COMPROMISE AND NULLIFICATION: HENRY CLAY AND SECESSION 
By the mid 1820’s, despite his best efforts, Henry Clay’s brainchild he came to know 
fondly as the American System was growing out of favor.  Most citizens and their elected politi-
cal officials had grown wary of centralized systems and strong governmental programs.  Fear of 
a strong national bank and distaste for paying for projects in areas that were seemingly distant 
and disconnected from other taxpayers had tainted the internal improvements program.  The 
falling out of favor of the American System caused even some of its most ardent believers to 
42 
 
 
 
walk –though others ran- away from it.78  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the tariff that 
was born out of the American System had never been as popular as some of the other parts of 
the project, but by 1828, the tariff was lifted up by states-rights politicians as proof of the gov-
ernment’s attempt to ascertain nearly absolute power.  As a result, Henry Clay was forced to 
attempt yet another compromise which would affect not only the tariff, but the role of gov-
ernment, the Constitution, and the institution of slavery within the country. 
By 1833, South Carolina, led by co-creator of the American System and Clay’s former po-
litical cross party ally John C. Calhoun, was threatening nullification and used the tariff as its 
primary scapegoat.  Although the tariff was not inherently within South Carolina’s best econom-
ic interests, the fundamental argument was less about the tariff and more about the out-
stretched arm of the federal government embodied by the tariff and centralized policies, like 
the American System.  Southern states deemed the tariff unconstitutional and cried for it to be 
revoked immediately, while the agricultural West and the manufacturing the Northeast were 
both in favor of such a tariff.79  
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 Henry Clay was forced to form not only a compromise between two opposing forces 
like in the Missouri Compromise, but he was also required to make his own compromises.  He 
was forced to limit, if not entirely eliminate, the very project he created.  He would do so all in 
the name of maintaining the Union and meeting the demands of the ever-shifting political land-
scape.  Clay’s ability to broker yet another compromise and diffuse secessionist threats is proof 
of his proficiency as a politician. But more importantly, his reactions, decisions, and compro-
mises during the Nullification Crisis culminating in 1833 are great examples of Clay’s political 
ideology.  It was the first time in his political career at the federal level that he was required to 
completely rethink his personal politics and decide whether to stand firm or be willing to do 
what was best for the nation.  Clay chose unionism over personal success and fulfillment; he 
chose compromise over didactically imposed laws, policies, and programs, no matter how be-
loved.   
After the alleged “corrupt bargain” which garnered Clay the position of the Secretary of 
State and cost Andrew Jackson the election in 1824, Clay’s career took an uncharacteristic 
plunge.  Clay’s time as the Secretary of State has been hailed by some historians as a failure, by 
others a disappointment and others still as simply a forgettable moment in Clay’s otherwise ex-
traordinary career.  Those bemoaning circumstances were most likely predicated on Clay’s ac-
cepted political expertise and his propensity for paradigm-altering ideas, which could have been 
a boon for the history of foreign policy for the nineteenth century.  Instead, Clay continued to 
push his internal improvements plan, and created an Indian removal policy that was erratic at 
best. He found himself in the middle of arguing domestic rather than foreign policy.  The failure 
of Clay in the most prestigious position he would ever hold was a turning point in Clay’s per-
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spective and temper as it was to say the least, a humbling experience in an otherwise grand po-
litical career.80 
One of the few accomplishments during Adams’ presidency was the tariff passed on 
May 19, 1828.  Intended to protect American manufacturing, the tariff placed a high tax rate on 
imported goods, while also covering basic government expenses.  Most Southerners were 
strongly opposed to the tariff as they saw it to be a terrible abuse of power.  Meanwhile, prom-
inent Democrat Martin Van Buren, who after Jackson’s win in the 1828 election was appointed 
Secretary of State, perpetuated a relationship with Great Britain, or as Clay saw it, “degrading 
the American eagle before the British lion.”  Clay saw this relationship as a direct attempt to 
undermine the tariff and the entire American System.81 
Clay truly was aggressive and confrontational, particularly when his American System 
was challenged or threatened.  John Quincy Adams, who was more of an anti-friend to Clay 
than an advocate, described Clay as “absurd upon the tariff,” thus making any negotiation diffi-
cult at best with the Kentuckian.82   Clay was adamant about protecting the tariff.  Clay once 
said “I think our policy, under existing circumstances, should be limited to two general objects: 
First, to maintain all that has been heretofore done in the support of the Tariff.”  Clay continued 
on to say, “If you allow any breach in the existing system, that is any repeal or deduction of du-
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ties now imposed, you endanger the whole.”83  His assessment would prove fairly accurate in 
the end, but he was certainly not aware that he would be the one to reduce the tariff, thus 
“endangering” his beloved system of Improvements and Protection.   
Ironically, Clay’s most heated political rival, Andrew Jackson, was actually in favor of a 
“judicious” tariff as late as 1827.  Jackson was shrewd and careful with his wording when it 
came to any tariff, not wishing to alienate any potential voters.  Jackson’s support of a tariff 
would best be described as a stance based in “middle ground,” but that proved insufficient for 
electability.  Jackson had already decided to challenge Adams in 1828 for the presidency and 
Jackson knew his position would have to change as too many votes would be lost, particularly in 
the South, if he remained moderate on the issue of tariff politics.  As Sean Wilentz described 
this tumultuous time, “To Southern Radicals, any sign of support for a protective tariff by Van 
Buren and [Jackson] was a potential deal breaker in the coming presidential election.”84 
   Meanwhile, southern radicalists like Thomas Cooper of South Carolina espoused the 
flaws and supposedly inherent injustices of the Tariff of 1828.  In a speech before Congress, 
Cooper questioned the benefits of the union saying, “We shall ere long be compelled to calcu-
late the value of our union, and enquire what use to us is this most unequal alliance?”85 In lock-
step with most Southern thinkers and politicians, the North was seen as the embodiment of 
government gone awry.  Men like Clay and Adams were paragons of abusive political power 
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and the south should remove itself from these domineering forces.  Partisanship was the politi-
cal norm of Adams’ presidency.  The Democrats’ party numbers grew in favor of “Jacksonian 
Partisans,” and the National Republicans were left to watch their party fall apart as the touted 
Clay-Adams coalition was clearly not up to the task of executive power.86  Southerner leaders 
railed against a protective tariff in 1820, and would likely do it again in 1828, particularly with-
out Clay as speaker of the House as he was in 1820.  The Democrats were “hell-bent” on bring-
ing down Clay and Adams and attacking Clay’s beloved protective tariff was the first step in en-
suring a lost election and perhaps a disgraced Henry Clay. 
Jackson won the presidential election of 1828 and was officially inaugurated in March of 
1829.  Jackson’s victory was bittersweet as he entered the White House alone as his beloved 
wife, Rachel Jackson, died of a heart attack before the inauguration.  Although there was no 
way to measure what caused Rachel Jackson’s untimely heart attack, President-elect Jackson 
blamed Clay for her death.   
The 1828 election was arguably the most controversial election, wrought with mudsling-
ing and character defamation.  Remarks on Jackson’s mother and Rachel’s divorce took their 
toll on Jackson and his family.  Cincinnati newspaper editor Charles Hammond, a compatriot of 
Clay’s, was among the most vitriolic.  In his largest paper, the Cincinnati Gazette, Hammond de-
scribed Jackson’s mother as a “common prostitute” and also published Rachel Jackson’s divorce 
papers from her first marriage that was believed to be abusive.87  Jackson blamed Clay for Ra-
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chel’s death and Clay did little to disavow his connection to Hammond and the slanderous 
newspaper articles, although no proof has ever surfaced to Clay’s alleged role.   
Nevertheless, Jackson never did forgive Clay, nor did he ever forget.88  It was unfair for 
Jackson to blame Clay for Rachel, but what this anecdote informs us of is the intense disdain 
that Jackson and Clay held for one another.  This extreme distrust and outright animosity be-
tween the two most powerful men in 1830s politics set the stage for the impending Nullifica-
tion Crisis of 1833.  Furthermore, it enlightens the modern reader of the greatness of Henry 
Clay to be able and willing to put aside his own project, the Tariff of 1828, and reach a com-
promise that saved the union, and he did so under the presidency of his hated rival.   
After the debacle of his failed presidential administration, Adams refused retirement, 
and avoided the typical hermitic lifestyle of past presidents post term.89  Instead of seclusion, 
Adams embraced public life again, winning a seat in the House of Representatives in 1831 for 
his home state of Massachusetts.  He would serve with adequate success, though not ever 
quite equal to his consistent greatness as a Senator or with such promise as he showed as a 
presidential candidate. However, Adams’ role in the Nullification Crisis of 1833 was pivotal and 
would greatly influence Clay’s future success.  Adams’ career would never fully recover from 
the blemish of his presidency, but he would serve in the House until his death in 1848.   
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Clay’s political career, ironically, was rejuvenated after his stint as Secretary of State, 
particularly as a result of a controversy of which Jackson was the root.  A letter sent from Jack-
son to Carter Beverley found its way into the Fayetteville Observer, in North Carolina.  In this 
letter, Jackson wrote to Beverley that Clay and “[Clay’s] friends” had approached a Congress-
man of “high respectability” as early as 1825 and informed Jackson’s sources that Clay’s camp 
was willing to help Jackson win the 1828 election if Jackson’s administration did not select John 
Quincy Adams as Clay’s successor for Secretary of State.  When the scandal broke, Clay vehe-
mently renounced the claims as “devoid of all truth and destitute of any foundation whatsoev-
er.”90 Clay and Adams both received strong criticism from both Democrats and National Repub-
licans alike for the political patronage of the supposed “corrupt bargain” in the election of 
1824.  If Clay was found to be yet again the source of a political bargain, it could have ruined his 
political future, but as fate would have it, Clay’s future was not only saved, but his rival’s was 
tarnished just ever so slightly.   
It was eventually leaked that the Congressman of “high respectability” was James Bu-
chanan of Pennsylvania, a man later named by Jackson in yet another letter to Beverley.  Bu-
chanan later came forward, though somewhat reluctantly, and published a letter acknowledg-
ing a private meeting with Jackson.  Buchanan claimed he acted of his own accord, thus at-
tempting to free Jackson of any and all blame in this conspiracy against Clay.  It was quite clear 
by the end of Buchanan’s letter that Clay never sent an emissary of any kind to Buchanan or 
Jackson to discuss the upcoming election.  Although the controversy was not enough to stifle 
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Jackson’s presidential bid, it did help Clay save face and perhaps help cover his own political 
misgivings and scandals.91 
Clay spent the entirety of 1829 at his home plantation, Ashland, with his beloved wife 
Lucretia.  Despite his time away from office, which would be short-lived, Clay’s mind never 
strayed from politics, particularly with Jackson as the commander and chief.  Even Clay’s choic-
es of vacation stops were informed by his understanding of politics and “electioneering.” De-
spite Clay’s “retirement” he kept a vested interest in the goings on of Washington.  He opposed 
Jackson’s appointments and the lack of senatorial action against his cabinet choices.  But noth-
ing done or left undone by the senate compared to Clay’s disdain for the Jacksonian veto of an 
internal improvements bill. 92 
The failed legislation, which was known as the Maysville veto, approved the extension of 
the National Road from Maysville to Lexington, Kentucky.  Jackson questioned virtually every 
element of the bill.  First, he deemed it to be only local in interest, and rightly so, as the exten-
sion would only affect the state of Kentucky. Secondly, he questioned the Constitutionality of 
the internal improvements ideology.  Although he was essentially in favor of basic projects like 
roads, canals, among other fundamental improvements, Jackson was unwilling to support any 
project he deemed “Constitutionally dubious” which included any project that was not truly na-
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tional in nature.  Ironically, Jackson accepted the inevitable truth that taxes could not be levied, 
or dispersed with absolute equality, but could not accept any imbalance of the internal im-
provements plan, thus he vetoed not only the Maysville bill, but several improvement bills over 
the next two years.93   
However, the most problematic issue for Jackson surrounding internal improvements, 
specifically the Maysville road, was the economics of such projects.  Under Clay’s American Sys-
tem, the protective tariff was designed to help lower the debt, protect manufacturing, and pay 
for the federal internal improvements program.  Jackson’s stance on tariffs prior to the 1828 
election was one of moderation, but his moderate stance would not last, as politics demanded 
he choose a side.  Jackson was in favor of the Tariff of 1828, as passed by Clay and Adams, but 
after his first year as president, Jackson had a slight change of heart.  Influenced by Calhoun and 
the growing talk of nullification in 1829-1830, then the greater influence of Martin Van Buren, 
Jackson had all but given up on moderate protective tariffs, and instead adopted a stance of 
low tariffs in hopes of dissuading southern voters from abandoning his administration. 94   
Clay’s response to the veto was swift and angry.  Clay repeatedly suggested to several 
key National Republicans and his political friends that he felt, “[Jackson] has lost the whole 
West, I verily believe… The Old Buck is mortally wounded.  He will run away, make a show of 
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vigor and fall.”95   Throughout the summer of 1830, Clay received letters of support and a notice 
that the National Republican Party formed a committee to name a nominee for the upcoming 
1832 Presidential election.  Clay was atop that list of potential candidates.  Despite the nomina-
tion committee all but handing Clay the proverbial keys to the National Republican party, Clay 
consistently reiterated one point, “[It would be] better not to limit [the convention] to the nom-
ination of any particular individual, but to place it upon the basis of certain great principles to 
be enumerated, and leave it to the free designation of such person a will best combine a hearty 
support of those principles.”96  Those principles included, at least for Clay, to oppose Jackson at 
every turn.  Furthermore, Clay wanted to make the American System, and thus the tariff of 
1828, the crux of the election against the Democrats, thus taking down what Clay thought to be 
the greatest threat the union and instilling a program that would cement his legacy in American 
history.97 
In 1831, Jackson’s administration appeared to be unraveling.  President Jackson had to 
deal with a split that developed between himself and Vice President John C. Calhoun; the rift 
was created out of a firestorm of political distrust and alienation.  First was the issue with Jack-
son’s cabinet, which was almost entirely disbanded at Jackson’s request. Three of the cabinet 
members were supporters and friends of Calhoun which included Treasury Secretary Samuel 
Ingham, Attorney General John Berrien, and Navy Secretary John Branch. A fourth member of 
the cabinet, Secretary of State Martin van Buren, opposed Calhoun, particularly on the issue of 
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the power of the federal government versus the states. The fifth member of the cabinet in 
question was Jackson's close friend, John Eaton. 
Eaton married a few months before Jackson became president, and stories said he and 
the young woman lived together before they were married. Vice President Calhoun tried to use 
the issue to force Eaton from the cabinet, and started a personal campaign against Mrs. Eaton. 
Calhoun's wife, Floride, and the wives of his three men in the cabinet, refused to have anything 
to do with her, which angered Jackson as he saw it to be petty politics and the most prominent 
flaw in Washington. 
But the split between Jackson and Calhoun was most likely deepened as a result of two 
other issues. First, Jackson learned that Calhoun -- as a member of former president James 
Monroe's cabinet -- had called for Jackson's arrest. Calhoun wanted to punish Jackson for his 
bloody and “extralegal” military campaign into Spanish Florida in 1818. 
Secondly, Calhoun's believed that the rights of the states were stronger than the rights 
of the federal government. The South Carolina native’s feelings became well known during the 
debate on the Tariff of Abominations.  Jackson did not fully support the tariff because he felt it 
favored manufacturing over agriculture, but it was signed into law by proper legal avenues and 
must be adhered to accordingly. Meanwhile, Calhoun’s penchant for nullification language had 
grown steadily since the Tariff of 1824- which is the moment that historians note as the time of 
death of Henry Clay’s and Calhoun’s political alliance - was enacted into law.   
Jackson’s break from Vice President John C. Calhoun was a shock to the entire country 
and threatened Jackson’s electability in the South, but nevertheless, Jackson thought it neces-
sary.  Jackson and Calhoun had been drawn to one another due to their shared disdain for 
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broad constructionism, but even that had its limits, especially for Jackson, who despite all their 
differences, was a unionist like Clay, and would not accept secession for any reason.  As a result 
of his political convictions, Jackson and Calhoun ended their tenuous ticket in 1831 and Jackson 
went the rest of his first term without a Vice President, while Calhoun returned to South Caroli-
na to rouse nullification and anti-federal sentiments.98 
The election of 1832 was arguably Clay’s best and worst chance at the presidency.  Jack-
son’s campaign and administration were coming off a terrible year of turmoil and uncertainty, 
but yet Jackson’s popularity was never higher.  In fact, the next president to win the majority of 
the popular vote in consecutive elections would be Ulysses S. Grant in 1872.  Clay had an estab-
lished platform with solid support from powerful individuals.  If he had been running against 
any other figure, history may have seen Clay give the inauguration speech in 1833, but Jackson 
had the people on his side.  Jackson had changed presidential politics from being a game won 
and lost by having powerful allies and politically savvy elites as backers, to a “common man” 
form of politics where the victor won a popularity contest.  Nevertheless, Clay lost the election, 
mostly due to the issue surrounding the Second National Bank, which Jackson and average 
Americans disdained.  They saw the Bank as an abuse of federal power. What is worse, Jack-
son’s masterful political game changing made Clay’s policies look, in historian Robert Remini’s 
words, “totally unsuited to this age of democracy and reform.”  Clay was compared to Alexan-
der Hamilton, a well-respected politician in his own day, but antiquated and obsolete by 1832.  
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To use modern political jargon, Clay appeared “out of touch” with the average American citizen, 
and Jackson played that to his advantage well.99   
 While Clay and Jackson prepared for a collision course in the 1832 election, Nullifiers 
and southern anti-tariff contingencies had gathered political sway in South Carolina.  Their 
power had been legitimately building since the Tariff of 1828 was signed into law, but they ar-
guably were a driving force in southern politics since the initial creation of the protective tariff 
when the country first formed under Alexander Hamilton’s leadership.  Like Jackson, Nullifiers 
questioned the Constitutionality of the protective tariff and the powers inherent to the federal 
government to levy such means of revenue.  In a twist of fate though, Jackson’s low tariff 
stance and his absolute disdain for the Bank of the United States (BUS) were in complete 
agreement with the Nullifiers, but Jackson hated nullification as much as he hated Clay!100  Clay 
and Jackson were in agreement on their hatred for nullification, but went about addressing this 
issue in very different ways.   
The Tariff of 1832 was the last straw for Nullifiers.  A new tariff was deemed necessary 
and Clay pushed for a tariff designed to protect manufacturing and his American System, but 
the numbers he initially asked for were just too high for the Jacksonian administration and for 
the House.  Clay had been able to get his bill through the committee but it was dead on arrival 
to the House of Representatives.  Clay instead introduced an alternative tariff and land bill, 
similar to Thomas Benton’s which would help protect the American System and Clay’s electabil-
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ity in the upcoming presidential election.  Clay helped Congress reach an agreement on a new 
tariff on manufacturing.  Furthermore he pushed for an increase in revenue from public land 
sales as a consolation for his Western constituency, which most individuals accepted as a com-
promise, although the extent of the tariff and the land bill was not even close to what Clay 
deemed acceptable.  Nevertheless, Nullifiers in South Carolina saw this less as a compromise 
and more as proof and an opportunity to dissolve from the union.  After Clay’s defeat in the 
election of 1832, South Carolina officially nullified the Tariff of 1828 and 1832. 101   
Clay’s philosophy on how he approached the nullifiers is vividly clear.  In a speech given 
in 1830, Clay systematically explained the rights of the states, in his own opinion and what the 
Constitution allowed.  The states as a collective could amend the Constitution, annul acts of 
Congress, change the basic functions of government, and yes, even dissolve the union, but a 
single state?  To that Clay said a resounding no.  Clay stated that the debate of nullification of a 
single state produced two questions which Congress would have to answer.  First, did the state 
have a right to nullify an act of Congress and thus secede; secondly, if they did have the right, 
would it be in Congress’ and the union’s best interest to “yield consent” to the unwieldy state?  
Clay’s answer to the first question was a resounding no, as he did not even believe that the 
states had such a right of nullification in the first place, thus voiding the second question alto-
gether.  Clay did not entirely answer the second question in this particular speech but did at 
least set the table for understanding where Clay was coming from when he handled the Nullifi-
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cation Crisis of 1833.  Clay not only disdained nullification as a practice and a political exercise, 
but thought it was beyond the realm of rights given to the state.102  
In contrast, Sean Wilentz, a noted Jacksonian scholar, states that Jackson saw the tariff 
discussion and nullification as two separate issues.  On the one hand, according to Wilentz, 
Jackson believed the tariff was negotiable, while on the other hand, nullification was not nego-
tiable.103  In a certain light, Clay’s and Jackson’s perspective could appear similar, but they are 
unequivocally different.   According to Wilentz, Nullification was about unconstitutional mo-
tives, which were not acceptable within the political perspective of Andrew Jackson.  However, 
anti-protection supporters, i.e. anti-tariff contingencies, also founded their stance on a deep 
abhorrence of what they deemed to be unconstitutional: any one against the tariff cited its lack 
of constitutional backing.  Thus despite Wilentz’s best efforts to separate nullification from the 
tariff, Jackson’s stances appear contradictory.  How can one argue against all things unconstitu-
tional, like nullification, but then support a tariff until it is deemed unpopular by his Southern 
constituency, and then decide a tariff is unconstitutional and thus beyond his political support 
and philosophy? The answer is simply politics. Jackson should not be condemned for this con-
clusion, but neither should he be given a proverbial pass.  Jackson’s own response to the tariff 
and nullification specifically, was a bewildering endorsement of states’ rights as a principle, but 
a few days later, Jackson threatened force, and asked Congress for the powers of martial law if 
he deemed necessary to force collection from South Carolina.104  Clay feared Jackson’s actions 
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and inconsistencies, but more importantly, Clay took on the role of compromiser as a means to 
undermine Jackson’s fledgling second term.   
On February 1, 1833, the tariffs were set to be abolished, but slightly cooler heads in 
South Carolina managed to postpone the abolishment in hopes of a possible agreement.  The 
impending politics of the crisis, as politics often do, made some very strange bedfellows.  Clay’s 
long-time ally Daniel Webster was in favor of the Force Bill proposed by Jackson and was 
against any larger tariff that Clay was likely to propose.  Meanwhile, Clay found an unlikely ally 
in John C. Calhoun.  Although Calhoun would have preferred a tariff on the lower end of the 
spectrum like Webster and the president, Calhoun was unwilling to allow Jackson the satisfac-
tion of taking any credit in averting the impending crisis.  Clay and Calhoun began working to-
gether in December of 1832.  Clay and Calhoun met, at first with icy stares and chilly silence, 
but after many stops and starts and what one would assume was an exhausted amount of small 
talk, Clay and Calhoun worked through the crisis until an initial compromise was formed.  The 
first draft was formed into three parts, a preamble, and two proceeding sections.  The pream-
ble acknowledged the existence of political differences of protective tariffs, duties, and the like.  
However, it also noted the desire to settle these differences in a way that was fitting a democ-
racy and avoid any confrontation either by war, secession, or both.  The other sections of the 
draft stated that the existing laws would remain enforced until March 3, 1840 and then every-
thing would be repealed.  Also, until 1840, no higher or secondary duties would be enacted.  
Also the money gathered would be used solely for the purpose of providing revenue to pay off 
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the debt and any other necessary government expenditure, but not for “the protection or en-
couragement of any branch of domestic industry whatever.”105 
Clay knew that his decision to work with John C. Calhoun to fix this issue would result in 
a drastic change of National Republican politics, if not completely alter them and the party for-
ever.  The party had made a reputation on Internal Improvements, broad interpretation of the 
Constitution, and liberal economic policies like pro-manufacturing as opposed the yeoman 
farmer culture of the party of Jefferson and Jackson.  Clay stated, “A single misstep…would de-
molish and scatter the party who has rallied around the American System, the Constitution, and 
the Federal Judiciary;” foreshadowing words if there ever were any.  In short, Clay saw the writ-
ing on the wall; a compromise was needed and either they let South Carolina secede (and plau-
sibly the entire South along with it) and thus maintain slavery, or he rings the death knell of his 
American System by changing the potency of the tariff, the lifeblood of internal improvements.   
The election of 1832 was the last presidential election for the party as its remnants were born 
anew as the Whig party, but Clay was its unapologetic leader.  More important to Clay was that 
his work with Calhoun would save the union, even at the expense of the welfare of the Ameri-
can System.106 
  The initial proposal passed the House, but failed to pass the Senate.  Clay and Calhoun 
went back to drawing board and created another compromise, one perhaps a bit more palata-
ble for the Senate.  Clay presented the compromise to floor on February 12, 1833.  The new bill 
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differed from the Verplanck plan of immediate reduction in favor of a gradual reduction starting 
in 1834.  The duties would lower over a six year period and then freeze for two years until 1842.  
After 1842, the tariff would become a revenue only tariff and would no longer provide protec-
tion for American manufacturing.107  In this way, Clay achieved the two things he most wanted 
out of this compromise.  First, Clay could protect manufacturing for at least a while longer to 
allow companies to grow accustomed to lesser and lesser protective measures.  Secondly, the 
plan helped to establish fundamental standards for tariff law and proceedings for the federal 
government as before they were quite obviously erratic at best. 
Clay presented the compromise with affective fervor and balance.  He ended his speech 
to the Senate with a plea to avoid civil war and to “heal, before they are yet bleeding, the 
wounds of our distracted country.”108 After Clay’s last word echoed in the hall, Democratic sen-
ators were vying for the floor immediately, but the chair, with historical fortuity, acknowledged 
Calhoun.  As Calhoun stood and espoused of the laudable compromise formed by Clay, the rest 
of the Senators were taken aback.  They were unaware of Clay and Calhoun working together 
because the two men were, as previously mentioned, less than amicable prior to this necessary 
merger.  With Calhoun in tow, the proposed bill passed the Senate and was written into law.  
Historians have argued over Clay’s motives during the 1830s on issues like the growing 
threat of civil war, the Nullification Crisis, and political extremists.  Arguably Clay’s greatest po-
litical desire was to win the presidency, but Clay famously said in an address to the Senate on 
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February 9, 1839, “I would rather be right than president.”109  Sean Wilentz describes Clay dur-
ing these years as a man who “alienated” northern abolitionists while placating southern slave 
holders, a sentiment most likely grown out a Jacksonian perspective of Clay’s proposed com-
promises in 1820 and 1833.  Wilentz concludes that Clay thus showed his “moral bankrupt-
cy.”110  But instead what we see from Clay is that he was neither alienating nor was he morally 
bankrupt, but rather he was trying to formulate a sense of unity and compromise. 
The ideological perspectives that most clearly inform Clay’s approach to the “Tariff of 
Abominations” and the impending threats to nullify were first, the role of the Constitution.  In 
short, Clay had to navigate the powers granted to him and Congress as elected officials, but 
that was juxtaposed to the powers of the states.  So much of the argument surrounding the 
Nullification Crisis was whether something could pass as constitutionally acceptable, or if it was 
a threat of tyranny and a devastating breach of authority.  
Secondly, the Tariff of 1828 forced Clay to reach yet another compromise to sustain the 
Union. Compared to the Missouri Compromise, the “Tariff of Abominations” presented Clay 
with much more at stake, particularly in relation to his personal politic policies and ambitions.  
Nevertheless, he was willing to suspend or completely upheave his own goals to ensure Union 
stability.  Clay’s efforts would prove fruitful in the end, bringing an end to the Nullification Crisis 
and negotiating a lower, more agreeable tariff which Southern farmers could swallow.  Howev-
er, Clay would lose the American System, if not completely, certainly on the grand scale he had 
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imagined.  He lost the National bank, the higher protective tariff, and was forced to watch his 
greatest political rival, Andrew Jackson, become president.  But Clay’s ideology and political 
makeup made honoring the Constitution and the integrity of the Union paramount in any polit-
ical decision or compromise he made.  
Thirdly, slavery crept its way into Clay’s thought process during the Nullification Crisis 
and the decade after. The Nullification Crisis was a complex issue that dealt primarily with eco-
nomics and the rights of the state versus the government, but those same issues are the back-
bone of the political discussions surrounding slavery.  Thus it is not hard to peel back the layers 
of the Nullification Crisis and see how slavery played a central role in the intellectual makeup of 
the Crisis and its proceeding ramifications in the 1830s and 1840s.   
 For example, in 1844, Clay wrote a letter to William C. Rives, a member of the House of 
Representatives.  In the letter, Clay wrote, “I have always believed that the steady and united 
opposition of the South, in former times, to [the tariff of 1842 and 1828], was the principle 
cause of abolition.”111 Clay placed a great deal of blame on abolitionists for their progressive 
radicalization and on Southerners for their uncompromising stance on the Constitution and on 
the slavery.  Clay was a moderate whose goal was not emancipation at any cost, but a strong 
union rooted in Constitutional law.  Thus if settling the Nullification Crisis without bloodshed of 
American citizens or secession was possible and the arguments continued to circle around the 
rights and powers within the Constitution, then compromise and constructive debate had to 
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rule the day while extremists and “ultras” had to be denied.  This included a denial of immedi-
ate and, in Clay’s perspective, extreme abolition, and a denial of the rights of Nullification.   
 Later that same year, Clay continued an on-going dialogue with Charles Burchard and 
John J. Foote, men he considered fellow “political friends.”  In this correspondence, they dis-
cussed the evils of slavery and the most prudent way to emancipate while maintaining some 
sense of order and civility.112  A month later, Charles Burchard, a noted abolitionist, wrote to 
Clay again.  Burchard informed Clay of his intentions to leave the Liberty party, the largest abo-
litionist political party in the United States during the 1840s, and Burchard instead decided to 
support Clay and his approach to gradual emancipation.113  Clay urged both extremes to follow 
Burchard’s lead and find a way to have a reasonable, intermediate discussion on slavery with-
out the threat of secession.   
The point of these anecdotes is to show that Clay wanted to avoid yet another incident 
of nullification or threatened secession by maintaining his sense of moderation and compro-
mise, even on an issue he had repeatedly deemed as an evil.  Clay gave a speech on slavery on 
February 7, 1839, saying: 
I am, Mr. President, no friend of slavery.  The searcher of all hearts 
knows that every pulsation of mine beats high and strong in the cause of 
civil liberty.  Wherever it is safe and practicable, I desire to see every por- 
tion of the human family in the enjoyment of it.  But I prefer the liberty 
of my own country to that of any other people; and the liberty of my 
own race to that of any other race.114 
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Clay’s defense of liberty is politically savvy, but the important clause in his speech is that 
he would “prefer the liberty of my own country to that of other people.”  Clay is trying to ex-
press to the Senate that the fundamental issue is not slavery itself.  The polarizing and demoral-
izing issue for Clay was the threat of disunion.  Seeing slavery as an inferior issue to disunion, 
Clay was just as opposed to placating abolitionist sympathies as he was to justifying slavery.   
Even within his own party Clay was willing to hold his middle ground.  Clay and fellow 
Whig party member Joshua R. Giddings had been sending correspondence to one another, dis-
cussing the up-coming party nomination for the 1848 presidential election.  Henry Clay was de-
lighted to be asked to run for president again but refused to run on the party’s increasingly abo-
litionist platform.  Giddings asked Clay to consider immediate emancipation of his own slaves in 
Ashland, but Clay firmly declined:   
I regret as much as anyone does the existence of slavery in our country, and wish 
to God there was not a single slave in the United States, or in the whole world.  
But here the unfortunate institution is, and a most delicate and difficult affair is 
it to deal with.  I have during my life emancipated some eight or ten, under cir-
cumstances which appeared to me to admit of their emancipation. 
 
Clay invited Giddings to Ashland to see how he treated his slaves and learn that he took good 
care of them and that most of his slaves would “perish if [Clay] sent them forth in the world,” 
citing old age, sickness, or injury as the reason for him keeping them on his family estate.  Clay 
ended the correspondence succinctly: 
But whatever I may or might do towards them must be wholly independent of all 
political motives or considerations; it must rest exclusively with my own sense of 
duty and propriety.  Nor do I believe that if it were possible for me to be influ-
enced by the motive of my own political advancement in the emancipation of my 
slaves, at this time, it would tend in the smallest degree to the promotion of an 
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end.  My object and purpose would be alike assailed by the ultras on both sides, 
if not by others.115  
 
Clay understood slavery was an evil, but it was a delicate situation that would have dis-
astrous consequences if immediate emancipation were forcibly implemented on southern and 
western slave holders.  Clay rejected “ultras” from both ends of the spectrum and did so with-
out “sacrificing principles,” both personal and political, even though this meant rejecting his 
best hope for attaining the presidency.116 
Clay’s success in the Nullification crisis  rested on Clay’s perception of the role of the 
Constitution, the rights of states (or lack thereof) to nullify, and his willingness to compromise 
even at the risk of his own political ambitions.  Clay was able to give the American System life 
for few years after the Crisis was officially resolved, but after 1842 when the tariff ended, the 
American System became a shell of its former self.  Clay placed practical solutions to the na-
tion’s problems over his own ideological preferences.  In a way, that was Clay’s ideology: one of 
compromise, moderation, and pragmatism.   
However, this would not be the last time the entire country looked to Clay for answers 
and guidance, as the resolution of the Nullification Crisis, much like the compromise of 1820, 
would prove to be only a stop-gap in the building tensions between Northern and Southern 
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states.  But for a brief moment, Jackson may have been the nation’s president, but Clay was the 
nation’s Savior.117 
 
   
 
 
 
4. OMNIBUS BILL OF 1850: HENRY CLAY AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 
At the start of 1850, Henry Clay was in the midst of a political tempest; a storm of disun-
ion threatened the integrity and stability of the ship of state.  The virulent split between the 
secessionists and abolitionist voices was more combative than even during the threat of 
1820.118  Despite marked opposition, Clay pleaded with his fellow Senators, both Democrat and 
Whig, to put aside their regional agendas in the name of compromise, just as they had done 
thirty years earlier.  But as was true thirty years earlier, Clay held the responsibility of creating 
the foundation of compromise by leading the extremists back across the “dreadful crevasse” 
created by slavery that divided them politically and culturally.119 
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The Compromise of 1850 is a well-documented, contentious piece of American history.  
Wrought with competing theses and theories, the historiography of the political crisis of 1850 is 
a veritable minefield.  Sean Wilentz, noted historian of the Democratic Party and author of Rise 
of American Democracy, argues that Clay was not motivated by compromise, but by ambition 
and only secondarily the Union.  In short, Wilentz believes that Clay presented something that 
was less of a compromise and more of a truce, intended to garner political power and to un-
dermine the current president, Whig Zachary Taylor. 120  Whig historian Daniel Walker Howe, 
though slightly kinder to Clay, still calls Clay’s primary motivation a sort of “enlightened self-
interest.”121  Furthermore, Wilentz depicts Clay in a purely political context, that is, Clay was not 
concerned with ideology, but was instead focused on political gamesmanship and personal suc-
cess.  Howe argues against Wilentz’s purely political stance by establishing Clay as the ideologi-
cal embodiment of Whig culture, philosophy, and politics.122  I acknowledge that an element of 
self-preservation is present at all times but to suggest self-interestedness was Clay’s primary 
motivation, which is akin to selfishness, is where Wilentz and Howe fail to fully appreciate and 
understand Clay on an intellectual, philosophical level. 
The focus of this chapter is the intellectual underpinning of Clay and his version of the 
Compromise of 1850.  What aspects of Clay’s political philosophy went into creating the Com-
promise of 1850, and how do these relate to the political meta-virtue of compromise, are two 
                                                          
120 
Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2005), 495, 572, 638. 
 
121 
Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: the Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (Oxford: Oxford 
Press, 2007), 401; Also see Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: Chicago Press, 1979), 270. 
 
122
 Howe, Political Culture, 128-129. 
 
67 
 
 
 
of the primary questions at hand.  An examination of Clay’s speeches on the Compromise and 
its particulars reveals a political philosophy that is not only conducive to compromise, but re-
quired it.   
Clay’s penchant for compromise is most clearly noted within the crisis of 1850, and 
when it is dissected, the intellectual infrastructure of the Compromise is patterned out.  Three 
aspects of Clay’s political philosophy are present in his attempted compromise: his deep seated 
need to maintain the Union; his interpretation of the Constitution and the Congress’ powers; 
and most contentiously, his view of popular sovereignty.  By looking at each of these three ele-
ments of Clay’s political perspective, Clay and his intentions become a bit clearer. Furthermore, 
approaching Clay and the Compromise in this nature undermines previous historiographical ac-
counts of Clay’s self-interestedness or his failure to instill popular sovereignty within his initial 
compromise.123  
What is important to recognize is the stability of Clay’s political philosophy. The creation 
of the Missouri Compromise, the American System, the American Colonization Society, the 
Compromise Tariff of 1833, are vital to understanding how Clay reached this point in the twi-
light of his career.  Specifically what these personal and political experiences tell historians is 
how Clay defined a compromise.  For Clay, a compromise was equal parts ideological and politi-
cal, which meant that political and philosophical concessions must be made to ensure a com-
promise’s success.  But most importantly, Clay saw a compromise as a situation where there 
are victories and defeats on both sides.  This balance should be so precise that there can be no 
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winners and no losers.  With this understanding of Clay’s desire for and definition of the great 
political virtue of compromise, the reader can now more fully understand how Clay’s Compro-
mise of 1850 was arguably his greatest political achievements.124 
Clay’s debate over the proposed 1850 compromise, later known as the Omnibus bill, ac-
tually began in 1847.  Clay, between December 1847, and early March 1848, emerged as the 
leader for the Whig party nomination for the presidential election in November 1848.  He had 
maintained staunch opposition to the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), and he desired nei-
ther to partake in the war, nor to reap any rewards or land from it.  The Whigs were fairly cer-
tain they could win an election on such a platform, but Nicolas Trist, an American diplomat ap-
pointed to Mexico by then President James K. Polk, defied orders from the president and re-
mained in Mexico to negotiate for peace.  Not only did his presence upset military leaders, but 
Trist, in fact, organized and signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.  The treaty garnered the 
United States the rights to the New Mexico territory and the Alta California territory.  The addi-
tion of new lands was exactly what Clay wanted to avoid, as he knew that adding more territo-
ries and eventually more states would only complicate the slavery issue.  His foresight was un-
canny, as the new territories encouraged Congressman David Wilmot to produce the Wilmot 
Proviso, a controversial piece of legislation which enflamed sectionalism and disunion.125   
                                                          
124
 Robert V. Remini, At the Edge of the Precipice: Henry Clay and the Compromise that Saved the Union (New York: 
Basic Books, 2010), 4. 
 
125
 Michael F. Holt, Political Parties and American Development: From the Age of Jackson to the Age of Lincoln (Ba-
ton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 17.  For the Whig perspective of the Wilmot Proviso, see Mi-
chael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 312. 
 
69 
 
 
 
The Wilmot Proviso never passed the Senate despite numerous attempts, but failed leg-
islation, when ideologically charged, can be just as effective as legislation that passed.  The 
Wilmot Proviso first appeared as a simple addendum to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, but 
was removed to appease Southern Democrats and expansionists.  The Proviso would have pre-
vented the spread of slavery into any new territory or state obtained via the war with Mexico.  
Wilmot’s intentions, and even his authorship, of the proviso are questioned, but nevertheless it 
does provide historians an intellectual and ideological thumbprint for many prominent eastern 
Democrats during the mid-nineteenth century.126   
Opponents of the Wilmot Proviso included not only Whigs, but southern Democrats and 
President Polk’s administration.  In fact, there was a general fear of the proviso amongst several 
Democrats because of the inherent sectionalism and the impending rupture that could have 
developed as a result of the proviso’s inception.127  In short, the political fracturing over the is-
sue of slavery and Wilmot Proviso, despite its inability to pass into law, was never more appar-
ent or severe during Henry Clay’s career.   
The threats of secession were as serious as they appeared. The basic premise of the 
Wilmot Proviso, which banned slavery in the seceded lands won in the war, was in direct con-
flict with the Missouri Compromise issued only thirty years earlier.  The Missouri Crisis, one of 
Clay’s great political victories, required that the argument of slave versus free-state be left not 
to the legislators or the people, but to geography.  No slave state could exist (with the excep-
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tion of Missouri) above 36° 30'.  If the northern border of Arkansas and the associated latitudi-
nal line were the boundary for slavery expansion, then the new territories, New Mexico and 
Utah must be admitted as slave states and California should be split in two: the southern part 
slave and the northern part free.  However, by this time, the Missouri Compromise was com-
pletely outdated as it applied only to the Louisiana Purchase.   
As a result of the ineffectiveness and lack of jurisdiction of the Missouri Compromise, 
Clay was fearful that the Wilmot Proviso would surely pass and would bring about sudden and 
irreconcilable differences between Northern and Southern states, citing many of the “Hotspurs 
of the South” who openly threatened dissolution of the Union if the proviso were passed in ei-
ther the House or the Senate.  Clay thought he could mend these rips in their continental fabric, 
believing that the threat of disunion was limited to only a few radical voices.128  Clay, however, 
underestimated the growing extremism amongst abolitionists.  The “dreadful crevasse” was 
ever widening and threats of secession were no longer ammunition for only Southern states 
and pro-slavery individuals, as even abolitionist extremists, or “Ultras” as Clay late called them, 
threatened disunion.129  It was left to the moderates of the Congressional house to create a way 
to bridge the sectional gap.  
Clay’s primary political principle was still the maintenance of the Union.  He could have 
radicalized himself toward either base for political gain or as a means to an end, i.e. for the 
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presidency, but he refused.130  Instead, Clay kept to his political ideology of compromise and 
moderation, which all but destroyed Clay’s political ambitions. Clay had tried for the presidency 
since 1824. In fact, no one tried harder to win the White House during the 1830s and through 
the 1840s than Henry Clay; he ran in all five elections during the two decades, from 1832 and 
his last in 1848. The Presidency was Clay’s political white whale that he was never able to con-
trol, command, or conquer in an otherwise effective and momentous career.   
After failing to win the party nomination in 1848, Clay felt betrayed by his fellow Whigs 
not just for failing to nominate him, but because he was not even given the honor of being 
Zachary Taylor’s vice president.  In fact, his friendship with fellow Kentucky Senator John J. Crit-
tenden was severely damaged, almost beyond repair. Clay’s supposed betrayal left him embit-
tered to the political process, and would never again feel a deep sense of affection for the Whig 
party, particularly its failure to uphold party ideals which he himself felt a great deal of pride in 
as he was among the framers of the Whig political culture.131  Clay’s health was not at its best 
either, as he was battling a severe cough and bouts of influenza.  All of these factors led Clay to 
bow out of the limelight.132       
Clay’s retirement from politics was short-lived.  Although the collapse of Whig ideals like 
change and improvements was difficult to take, the “possibility that the Union could shatter 
was terrifying,” for Clay.  Colleagues urged Clay to return to the Senate in 1849, and he did so to 
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help mend the disastrous effects of sectional unity. 133  Clay’s return was not like that of a hero, 
but rather like an old friend, or an old family member.  He was as popular as ever and goodwill 
abounded from all directions, except for the President’s administration.134  Clay used this new 
found popularity to his benefit; important issues were at hand, such as the California question 
and several other issues which were still left over from the Mexican-American war, and Clay 
needed every friend he could muster to improve his chances of creating compromise.   
The California question was as divisive as the Wilmot Proviso.  The states were balanced 
fifteen slave and fifteen free; allowing California into the Union would throw the country into a 
dangerous imbalance, or so the Southern states feared.  Northern Whigs demanded that slav-
ery be banned in the territories with California being the first such free state admitted, while 
Southern interests demanded that slavery be admitted to the territories, or California could not 
be admitted as a state.135   
It is from this historical context of severe divisiveness and extremism that Clay’s at-
tempted compromise would evolve.  Clay’s compromise had to address what he called in a later 
speech the “five bleeding wounds” of the country.  The first three were the California question, 
the issue of slavery in the territories, and what to do with Texas and its borders.  The other two 
were a fugitive slave law and what should be done with slavery in Washington D.C.  Slavery was 
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at the heart of each of these issues, and Clay was challenged to create a compromise that ad-
dressed each issue directly and fairly.136   
By January 21, 1850, Clay had formalized the basic principles of his compromise he 
would introduce to the Senate on the January 29.  Every aisle and seat were taken by curious 
and admiring masses.  Clay began in a weak voice, doubling over occasionally in a cough that 
still nagged him, but he soon regained his form.  His speech was once again in that strong, fa-
miliar tone, ripe with eloquence.  Clay’s proposal was made of eight resolutions: California 
would be admitted as a state without restrictions for or against slavery; all of the territories 
gained through the Mexico war were to be organized without restriction or condition for or 
against slavery; Texas was to give up any claim to the New Mexico territory; Texas’ debt ac-
crued prior to 1845 (year of Texas annexation) was to be paid by the federal government; slav-
ery would continue in the Washington D.C.; the act or trading slaves and auctioning of slaves 
was to be abolished in D.C.; Congress would retain no power to prohibit or restrict slave trade 
within the other states; and finally, a new, more powerful Fugitive Slave Law would be 
passed.137 
 The political reaction to Clay’s proposal is an important factor for the history of the 
Compromise, but what is more important to this endeavor is the specific wording and ideologi-
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cal foundation of each resolution. 138  Therefore, each part of Clay’s compromise will be exam-
ined, and placed within the context of Clay’s political philosophy.   
The first resolution was the direct response to the California question.  Clay called for 
the admission of California to the Union, “without the imposition by Congress of any restriction 
in respect to the exclusion of introduction of slavery within those boundaries.”  Clay continued 
on, admitting to the “irregularity in the movements which have terminated in the adoption of a 
Constitution by California was not preceded by any act of Congress authorizing the convention 
and designating the boundaries of the proposed State.”139  Clay previously held the notion that 
California, due to the “character of the country and its inhabitants, and their industrial pur-
suits,” would “forbade the likelihood of slavery ever being introduced there.”140 
At face value, it would seem unarguable that Clay introduced his first resolution without 
a favorable ending in mind, where California would be admitted as a free state.  Several South-
ern Democrats argued that the compromise should not allow California in as a state until an-
other state was admitted as a slave state to maintain political symmetry, similar to Clay’s previ-
                                                          
138 
 For an excellent look at the political reaction to Clay’s proposal, look at Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1964), 60-65.  Clay’s attempt at compromise was most likely fair, as nei-
ther extreme cared for the final product.  Southerners felt slighted and that abolitionism was not appropriately 
dealt with, that it was allowed to exist.  Northerners were equally disillusioned.  Senator Salmon P. Chase summa-
rized the North’s perspective best, “Sentiment for the North, substance for the South,” pp. 60. 
 
139 
Henry Clay, “January 29, 1850,” PHC 12 vols., 10:655.  California had formally adopted a state Constitution and 
appointed a governor prior to official statehood.  Therefore their situation seemed somewhat unique.  However, 
Clay was quick to mention that the state of Michigan had done something similar and was a current state and was 
a prominent member of the Union.  
  
140 
Henry Clay, “To John G. Proud et al.,” in PHC 12 vols., 10:628. 
 
75 
 
 
 
ous compromise in 1820.141  However, Clay’s current compromise, although contrary to prece-
dent, was arguably more in favor of Southern states and pro-slavery forces like Southern Dem-
ocrats than his previous one.   
Under the Missouri Compromise model, it was one state for another: one slave, then 
one free.142  However, despite equal number of states, the actual number of Congressional 
members and electoral votes was still in favor of the North and antislavery contingencies, prior 
to California’s admittance.  Furthermore, there was no realistic chance of splitting the state of 
California down the middle, allowing southern California to be slave and the northern territory 
to be free.  Also California had already created its own Constitution and, as an independent 
state, voted against slavery and thus it was written into their laws accordingly.  However, Clay’s 
introduced compromise actually gave Southern Democrats and pro-slavery aggregates their 
best chance at turning the other territories and future states into pro-slavery holdings.  Clay’s 
open-ended language allowed for what Democrats were often clamoring for, popular sover-
eignty.143  
Popular sovereignty is often attributed to Democrats Lewis Cass and Stephen A. Doug-
las, and rightfully so, as Clay never officially used the term in defense of his initial resolutions.144  
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Nevertheless, the ideological intent is still there and it is quite prevalent.  Clay acknowledged as 
much in a speech he gave on the Senate floor just a week later.  Clay asked, “has it not been the 
doctrine of all parties, that when a State is about to be admitted into the Union, that State has 
a right to decide for itself whether it will or will not have within its limits slavery?”145  The al-
lowance of a state and its people to decide their orientation in reference to tougher political 
issues like slavery was the essential definition of popular sovereignty for an 1850’s context.146   
The second resolution followed a similar vein, declaring that Congress would be “inex-
pedient” to provide a law either for or against slavery in the territories, namely New Mexico 
and Utah.  Again Clay used popular sovereignty ideology and wording to create a compromise, 
but this time, Clay attempted to placate Northerners, as popular sovereignty was more widely 
popular amongst Southern, pro-slavery Democrats.  In return for removing the Wilmot Proviso, 
Clay implied that Northern Democrats and Whigs should not fear the expansion of slavery into 
the new territories because “according to all the probabilities of the case, slavery never will be 
introduced into any portion of the territories so acquired from Mexico.”147  Furthermore, the 
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land here was no particularly good for agronomic ventures.148  Clay’s experience and success as 
a lawyer is quite apparent in the formation of this argument for amendment two.  Also we see 
Clay’s view of the Constitution and how he believed it operated.   
According to Clay, Mexico was against slavery moving into land it ceded, and any at-
tempt to move slaves there could risk the sanctity and validity of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hi-
dalgo.  Furthermore, Clay stated that the Constitution required that both the U.S. and Mexico 
must have agreed upon these terms with the ratifying of the treaty, if slavery were to have any 
legal chance of being introduced.  It is because of the legalities and constitutional ideology bur-
ied within Clay’s words that the second part of this amendment is important, despite being of-
ten overlooked.   
Clay called for the creation of a governmental body within the state.  Clay wanted the 
territories to have an accountable, governmental structure which could not only create laws, 
but also could follow laws.  In short, Clay feared lawlessness and anarchy more than the exten-
sion of slavery.  Also, there was an order to how statehood was achieved, and California con-
fused the process. California became a point of contention when it formed its own governing 
body and a state Constitution before an authorizing provision form Congress and before it was 
organized into a territory.  In short, California skipped ahead several steps toward statehood 
and thus went against precedent. To avoid a repeat offense and another possible two-three 
year process of arguing and debating, Clay pushed for an established government in to organize 
the remaining territories and allow them to create a territorial government.  Therefore what we 
see in amendment two is Clay’s penchant for popular sovereignty.  Clay pushed for popular 
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sovereignty in the territories and accepted the inevitable addition of the territories, but also 
posed what could not be seen as anything less than a warning that expansion could possibly 
lead to war with Mexico again, or at the very least, a failure to uphold the United States’ end of 
the treaty, that is, the U.S. could push its way into Mexico proper if not careful with the prece-
dent they were currently setting. 149  
The third and fourth amendments are tied together by Clay, but for simplicity’s sake, 
both shall be analyzed on an individual basis.  The third resolution was intended to fix the west-
ern border of Texas.  The borders of Texas were never officially drawn and stated; therefore 
Texas could lay claim to large chunks of the New Mexico territory.  To fix this issue, Clay placed 
the western boundary on the Rio del Norte (Rio Grande) and then north up the river until the 
New Mexico territory.  Then Clay suggested moving eastward until the line that the US and 
Spain initially agreed upon when they owed the territory.  Finally, Clay suggested a northern 
border running from El Paso to the Sabine River, which would lop off a hefty portion of prime 
agricultural land and a heavily populated area, namely Dallas.150  It was this last border which 
made the idea of federally organizing Texas a contentious piece of Clay’s proposal.  In fact, Clay 
often assumed Texas would be the most difficult aspect of his plan.151  But what implications 
did the boundaries really have?   
According to Clay, the failure to fix the Texas border could have resulted in two possibili-
ties.  One, Texas sovereignty could be put into question, not only from Mexico, but from other 
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states and territories as well.  Secondly, Texas could push its political borders into the territories 
thereby controlling their political autonomy.  This is most likely a positive spin that Clay put on 
the proposed amended boundaries of Texas.  By saying the amendment would protect Texas’ 
borders, Clay was attempting to divert attention away from the man behind the curtain- though 
it did not work. In the proposed bill, Texas, an admitted slave state, would have its borders 
shrunk and limited, while the new territories, which had the potential of being free states, 
would be given more land.   
There is also here still a question of popular sovereignty.  If Texas were left unchecked 
and allowed to lay claim to parts of New Mexico, then the territory and its people would in es-
sence forfeit their right to choose slavery or not in that region, as Texas was already a slave 
state.  Setting the northern border where Clay did would appease abolitionists, as the proposed 
idea would, for all intended purposes, free slaves or push slaveholders further south. Therefore, 
Clay fixed the borders to prevent the immediate and absolute spread of slavery, in exchange for 
the possible, though somewhat improbable spread of slavery.152  Furthermore, Clay felt that the 
South needed to make a concession or two for this to truly be a compromise. 
If Texas agreed to the Congressionally approved border, and ceded all rights to any part 
of New Mexico, the federal government would in turn, “provide for the payment of all that por-
tion of the legitimate and boa fide public debt of [Texas], contracted prior to annexation…and 
for which the duties on foreign imports were pledged by said state to its creditors.”  Clay went 
on to say that the debt should be picked up by the US government as a testament to the princi-
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ples of “truth and eternal justice.”153  The fourth resolution provided no particular insight into 
Clay’s intellectual framework outside of his ever present principle of unity.  It would be within 
the rights of the country to deny Texas help with its own debt, accrued during a time prior to its 
statehood, but this was a matter of fairness and not rights for Clay.  Furthermore, the payment 
of Texas’ debt could perhaps encourage goodwill between a heavily Democratic slave state and 
the federal government, especially since the newly formed borders would eliminate a large por-
tion of the slave state. 
 Clay’s fifth and sixth resolutions abolished the slave trade in DC, but not the practice of 
owning slaves, respectively.  His address to the Senate on the issue of slavery in Washington, 
D.C., and on the proposed compromise was an oral presentation of his political ideology, par-
ticularly his appeal toward the meta-virtue of compromise.  Clay, aware of the need for concil-
iatory action, bargained with slavers’ and abolitionist’s heartstrings, and asked both to make 
significant concessions in relation to D.C.    
Clay’s fifth resolution required a universal acknowledgement of the limitations of Con-
gress’s power in relation to slavery, a notion he broached nearly twelve years earlier.154  More 
specifically, Clay believed that the federal government had no right to ban slavery within the 
confines of Washington D.C. without expressed consent and an appropriate vote by the citizens 
of Maryland, as the land for DC was ceded from that state.155  Once again, Clay utilized the ideal 
of popular sovereignty within a non-Democratic framework.  That is to say, it was used as a 
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means of compromise rather than a standard of state’s rights or individual autonomy.  His use 
of popular sovereignty language though odes lend itself to his limited governmental influence 
idea he pushes forth.   
To reiterate his point, Clay spoke candidly about the role of government during his Feb-
ruary speech.   
The institution of slavery presents two questions totally distinct…slavery within 
the States, and slavery without the States.  Congress can interfere with slavery in 
the states only in three specific particulars: to adjust the subject of representa-
tion, to impose taxes on slaves when a system of direct taxation is made, and to 
perform the duty of surrendering, or causing to be delivered up, fugitive slaves.  
If Congress makes any further more for the overthrow or the extinction of slav-
ery, then my voice would be for war.  In such a case, resistance on the part of the 
slave States would be called for in defense of our rights, of our domiciles, of our 
property, of our safety, of our lives.  If civil war should break out over this viola-
tion of the Constitution, then the slave States should have the sympathy and 
good wishes, and desire for our success, of all men who love justice and truth.156  
 
Clay’s ideal of Congressional limitations was founded upon his reading of the Constitution.  Da-
ting back to his days as a lawyer, Clay looked at the Constitution in a very litigious manner, thus 
each infraction the government made warranted a specific and legal response by the populace.  
Furthermore, the universal imperative to which Clay adhered required that he hold the Consti-
tution as the source of justice.  Therefore if he perceived it to limit the Congress’s power to leg-
islate on slavery, then any action to that end was an unjust act, and one worthy of a secession-
ist response.   
Clay continued on in that same speech to say that the Constitution was one of only two 
sources of power in which slavery could be controlled, either to contract or to expand beyond 
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the states, into the territories.  The importance of this perspective, this aspect of Clay’s political 
philosophy, is that it allows for the argument of slave expansion to exist.  By allowing the argu-
ment to fundamentally exist, Clay gave it validity and thus that side must be fully acknowledged 
when making decisions of state.  In fact, Clay’s final words on the issue were that his fifth reso-
lution “neither affirms nor disaffirms the Constitutionality of the exercise of the power of aboli-
tion in the District.”  The only thing Clay described about D.C. abolitionism was that it was “in-
expedient.” Essentially, Clay saw it as a moot point.  The people had to make that kind of a de-
cision and if the government stepped in their stead, the government, in relation to the people 
of the District, would be with the inherent characteristics, a tyranny.157   
In the sixth resolution, Clay unburied his previous attempt to ban the slave trade in 
Washington D.C., but still opposed the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia without 
the consent of the residents. 158 Therefore, he felt that until such a vote could be arranged, 
Congress, as the governing body and representatives of the people, should refrain from disa-
greeable and egregious action.  Clay argued that instead of banning slavery outright, the Con-
gress did have the right to ban the trading of slaves in D.C.  Clay’s argument for the banning of 
the slave trade was that it was a grotesque sight to see slaves chained together, parading down 
the streets of the District in the front of magistrates and foreign dignitaries.  Therefore the pro-
posed ban was not against, “the sale by one neighbor to another which the one owns and the 
other wants,” but rather against the overt display which was “a shock to the sensibilities.”159  
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The sixth resolution does pair with the fifth and therefore does hinge on popular sover-
eignty, but it is this notion of image that is most interesting in Clay’s defense for abolishing the 
trade, but not the act of ownership.  Clay appeared to incite some realization that slavery was 
not a pretty business, a notion that offended the sensibilities of slavery’s staunchest of sup-
porters.  But according to Clay, If America were to look foolish, backward, or cruel to other na-
tions, it could undermine its influence and economic well-being in international endeavors. 
The Constitution, according to Clay, also forbid the outright abolition of slavery due to 
the amendment which required no private property could be taken for public use without just 
compensation.  In fact, Clay acknowledged that no European power which abolished slavery did 
so without some form of compensation for those who lost “property.”  These European powers 
were not even under constitutional pressure to do so, they did it because it was the just thing 
to do.  Therefore, it fell on the Congress to uphold their sacred vow to maintain the Constitu-
tion and thus could not force abolitionism on a group of people who neither wanted it, nor 
would be compensated for it.160 
The seventh clause required a new Fugitive Slave Act that would require the federal 
government to aid Southern slaveholders in the retrieving of their slaves.  Clay thought this 
problem was so evident, that his initial speech in January only contained one sentence on the 
matter.161  Clay was adamant about the need for a new Act, and its constitutionality.  He be-
lieved that Congress, every state, and “the officers of every State, every man in the Union has 
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the obligation to assist in the recovery of a fugitive slave from labor, who takes refuge in or es-
capes into one of the free states.”  Clay believed that the Constitution did not expressly support 
slavery in an enumerated sense, but it did support the power of the states and the rights of citi-
zens to their “property.”  Therefore, if “property” were to go missing, it was every citizen’s legal 
and constitutional duty to aid in returning said slave.162    
His language was clear and direct, and his ideological support was equally clear.  Henry 
Clay was not driven by a modern sense of humanist enlightenment, but by a sincere devotion to 
following the Constitution.  Every citizen bound to the Constitution was equally bound to up-
hold this law, according to Clay.  The returning of slaves was an act of patriotism and duty, de-
spite any personal feelings or disdain for the institution of slavery.   
In fact, Clay railed against an earlier ruling by the Supreme Court, Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, 
in which the Supreme Court ruled that there was a stark difference between “imposing imped-
iments and affording facilities.”163  In short, the Court maintained that state officials could not 
outright help the slaves escape from their earthly toil, but there was nothing illegal about state 
officials refusing to help slaveholders find the runaway slaves.  In fact, impeding a slave-owners 
attempt at recovery was within the rights of citizens within a free state, according to the Su-
preme Court.  Clay abhorred this ruling.  Clay argued for calm consideration of one’s duties and 
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that each state would “correct itself” if it had any “impeding” laws which would prolong or indi-
rectly prevent a fugitive slave from being returned to its rightful owner.164  
Clay concluded that the current laws for the returning or runaway slaves were woefully 
inadequate.  Therefore Congress had to act to bolster efforts and create more effective legisla-
tion. Clay even suggested imposing sanctions on states if they continually refuse to help return 
slaves.  The spirit of these laws should be Union first.  Clay’s long standing principle was Union 
first over the health and prosperity of these unfortunate souls.  Clay had no intentions of allow-
ing slavery to dissolve the Union, and if the only way to prove his willingness to stand for his 
country was to create and enforce laws for an institution he hated, he would do it if it meant 
goodwill for the country. 
The eighth and final element of the Henry Clay proposal involved the establishment that 
Congress had no power to obstruct the slave trade between the slaveholding states and that its 
conduct “depends exclusively upon their own particular laws.”165  Although, this has limited 
ideological elements, particularly any that differ from those previously mentioned, it is still 
worth noting that this particular resolution placed more emphasis on states as sovereign enti-
ties and less on the federal government.  This is an interesting break from his earliest years 
which sought large government for improvement programs and gradual emancipation legisla-
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tion.  I consider it a small bit of proof that Clay’s political philosophy changed over time and was 
more affected by the current political climate than by popularity or ambition.   
After Clay’s February speech ended, he was met with immediate criticism from the ex-
tremes, something he expected, especially from former ally, John C. Calhoun.  Although Cal-
houn was too frail and ill to give his speech, the words were indeed his own and spoke ill of 
Clay’s attempted compromise.  Calhoun asserted that Clay and others failed to see the slavery 
question for what it was.  For Calhoun, to deal with the institution was not the problem.  The 
failure of Clay and others like him was the inability to see that the source of discontent was not 
demagogues, or “ultras” as Clay identified them, but that all Southerners were discontented 
and disillusioned with the Union.   
Calhoun continued on to say that in order to fix this “dissent,” the slavery question 
should be handled with care and “justice.”166  Calhoun stated rather emphatically: 
The South asks for justice, simple justice, and less she ought not to take. She has no 
compromise to offer but the Constitution, and no concession or surrender to make. She 
has already surrendered so much that she has little left to surrender. Such a settlement 
would go to the root of the evil, and remove all cause of discontent, by satisfying the 
South that she could remain honorably and safely in the Union, and thereby restore the 
harmony and fraternal feelings between the sections which existed anterior to the Mis-
souri agitation. Nothing else can, with any certainty, finally and forever settle the ques-
tion at issue, terminate agitation, and save the Union.167 
 
Calhoun was thus placing the blame on the North and its unwillingness to uphold the Constitu-
tion.  Thus the North was not only being unfair, but unjust and unlawful.  This was a breech that 
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even Clay could not bring back.  When extremists no longer consider themselves extremists is 
when compromise dies, and a division between the two sides cannot be undone without great 
harm or great risk.  Clay nevertheless tried to establish a fair and balanced approach that was 
just as strongly supported as it was reviled.168 
Clay felt the nation at odds with itself.  In response to the growing schism and to Cal-
houn’s partisan words, Clay gave a speech that was entirely about the preservation of the Un-
ion.  Clay urged his fellow Senators and Congressmen to fight not for statehood or region, but 
for maintaining the integrity of the United States:   
This Union is my country. The thirty states is my country... She has created on my 
part obligations and feelings and duties toward her in my private character 
which nothing upon earth could induce me to forfeit or violate. But even if it 
were my own state—if my own state, contrary to her duty, should raise the 
standard of disunion against the residue of the Union, I would go against her, I 
would go against Kentucky in that contingency as much as I love her.  If blood is 
to be spilt by whose fault is it to be spilt? Upon the supposition, I maintain it 
would be the fault of those who raised the standard of disunion and endeavored 
to prostrate this government, and, Sir, when that is done, as long as it please 
God to give me voice to express my sentiments, or an arm, weak and enfeebled 
as it may be by age, that voice and that arm will be on the side of my country, for 
the support of the general authority, and for the maintenance of the power of 
this Union.169  
 
Togetherness and unity were the political lifeblood of Henry Clay’s last years in office.  He made 
one final plea to his fellow countrymen, both Democrat and Whig, to put aside their regional 
and cultural fears and wants in the name of compromise and unity.  In Clay’s speech to the 
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Senate on the Compromise of 1850, he attempted to appeal to the sensibilities and patriotism 
of both parties. As his speech came to a close, the elder statesman held aloft a fragment of the 
coffin of George Washington and described the relic as a “warning voice, coming from the grave 
to Congress now in session to beware, to pause, to reflect before they lend themselves to any 
purposes which shall destroy that Union which was cemented by [Washington’s] exertions and 
example.”170  Clay’s goal, even in his last years as a statesman, was to maintain the Union by 
brokering compromises and ignoring his personal feelings about slavery.  He pushed his 73 
year-old body to the precipice of sickness and weakness trying ardently to maintain that which 
George Washington had fought to create and that which he had spent his life fighting to pre-
serve.  Clay’s speech earned him loud applause, but his words were soon forgotten.   
The inability of either side to reconcile differences and reach a compromise that would 
lend itself to peace does not besmirch Clay’s legacy.  Clay’s inability to change the political cli-
mate of the 1850s was proof that Clay was right after all: the “ultraism” of abolitionist and pro-
slavery contingents was so toxic that it rendered the schism between the North and South be-
yond repair and left the country with no choice but abolition, secession, or Civil War.  
Clay’s compromises garnered him little praise this time.  Clay recognized that even his 
own party felt little need to “oblige [him]” in his conciliatory and mediating efforts.171  Aboli-
tionist sentiments among his peers within the Whig party were abundant, and Clay received a 
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great deal of criticism for his work with slave states and his supposed willingness to appease 
them.172   
A woman writer, known only as “Ondine,” wrote to Clay a harsh rebuke of his lackluster 
attempt to free the slaves.  She chastised Clay, stating, “Thou art called a great man, and hast 
many admirers; but I have never yet been able to discover any trace of generosity or justice in 
any of thy great speeches, compromises, or resolutions...Had’st thou one-half the love of God 
in thy heart thou hast for the Constitution or the Union - one-half the love of thy neighbor thou 
hast for thyself...thou wouldst glory in setting thy slaves at liberty.”173  Clay had not freed all of 
his own slaves, though he had practiced gradual emancipation and freed several slaves by this 
time in his life.  Ondine’s words were more telling than even she realized.  Ondine was astute to 
point out the love Clay had for the Constitution and Union, but Clay saw these traits as virtues 
in line with the well-being and sustaining of the country, not detriments which would tear it 
asunder.  For Clay, the political issues of the maintenance of the Union and compromise were 
always paramount, while slavery was secondary.  
Despite his attempts to reconcile abolitionists with slave holders, pro-slavery supporters 
were quick to dismiss Clay as a political afterthought in the waning years of his career.  On Feb-
ruary 20, 1850, Henry Clay spoke on the Senate floor against the “ultraism” within the country 
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and the danger it posed to Union.174  Clay was met with immediate opposition from both sides, 
but it was the pro-slavery contingent that was the most vocal.   
Henry Clay was in a verbal sparring match against Senator Henry S. Foote, a Democrat 
from Mississippi.  Foote, apart from being a Southerner, was a documented slave holder who 
saw any attempt at emancipation as an abrupt act of prejudice against the South and a breach 
of federal power.  Foote pointed out one of Clay’s speeches that had been used in the northern 
newspapers as proof of the evils of slavery. Foote argued that Clay had used his influence and 
reputation with “deadly effect against the South.”   
Foote, along with fellow Democratic Senator Jefferson Davis, criticized Clay for his ap-
parent inconsistencies toward slavery.  Clay responded, “I have made no change... I shall go to 
the grave with the opinion that slavery is an evil, a social and political evil.”  However, Clay 
closed his remarks saying, “I consider us all as one family, all as friends, all as brethren.  I con-
sider us all united in one common destiny; and those efforts which I shall continue to employ 
will be to keep us together as one family, in concord and harmony; and above all, to avoid that 
direful day when one part of the Union can speak of the other as an enemy.”175  Clay’s personal 
and political ideology is on unabashed display within these comments.  Clay was against slavery, 
both privately and politically, but it was all servile to a higher call.  Clay felt it was his duty above 
all else to protect and nurture the Union, preserving it at all costs.  The “ultraisms” were not 
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conducive to this goal, and thus Clay felt compelled to speak out against them and continue to 
push for compromise.  
The Compromise was put into law by September 1850 and the threat of disunion ended, 
at least for the time being.  Clay later reflected on the bill and he felt it contained “an equal 
amount of concession and forbearance on both sides,” though he admitted to the North’s 
“more liberal and extensive concessions.”176 Clay’s goal was never to reach out to or change the 
polarizing “ultras,” but to reach the middling groups.  Clay put his entire life, his entire historical 
and political culmination, into that speech and the coming months of intersectional, bipartisan 
work with Stephen A. Douglas.  Clay only hoped that the middle section of the body politic was 
still strong enough and large enough to maintain the Union.177  If not, Clay begged the heavens, 
that if disunion were unavoidable, if war was to be the country’s destiny, he prayed he would 
not survive to behold it.178  Fortunately for Clay, he would never see disunion as the illness that 
plagued Clay in his later years wreaked havoc on his body, and, in 1852, Henry Clay died at the 
age of 75.   
Henry Clay would never see disunion, but the Union desperately needed a man like Clay 
in the coming years; the country needed a man who would continue to uphold the political ide-
als of union, popular sovereignty, and a litigious though ideological interpretation of the Consti-
tution.  But most of all, the union needed compromise.  It is doubtful that Clay could have dif-
fused such polarizing politics and partisan forces of the later 1850s, but no one would have had 
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a better chance at it than Henry Clay.  In hindsight, Clay’s compromises may feel like stopgaps, 
and mere measures of appeasement that delayed the inevitable.  But even if we accept that 
view of Clay’s compromises, his ability to delay a conceivably inevitable civil war by nearly 40 
years is a testament to his genius, his political philosophy, and the right to the nickname, the 
Great Compromiser. 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION: DEATH OF A GIANT 
Henry Clay died on June 29, 1852, at the age of 75, after years of national service and 
political mediation. That same day, a young lawyer who had started making a name for himself 
in the Whig party appointed a committee in Springfield, Illinois, to arrange a public tribute to 
his fallen hero. Clay died in Washington, D.C., but before reaching his final resting place in Lex-
ington, Kentucky, Henry Clay would be given the greatest honor: his body would be allowed in 
the Rotunda of the Capitol building for viewing.  No other official, not even a president, had 
been given such an honor.  After two days in Washington, Clay’s body was carried by train to 
major cities across the country to allow visitors to pay their last respects.  On July 16, with 
stores closed and business suspended, Henry Clay’s body arrived in Springfield, Illinois. The pro-
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cession continued to the statehouse, where that young lawyer named Abraham Lincoln deliv-
ered a eulogy in the Hall of Representatives.179   
Lincoln’s eulogy began by comparing the life of the nation with Clay’s life, born only one 
year a part.  His life was recollected and his political accolades acknowledged, but Lincoln’s 
message was more than a list of accomplishments of a very accomplished man.  The eulogy was 
a prayer and a warning.  It was a commemoration of Clay and a hope that Clay’s legacy would 
never be misunderstood or misconstrued.  In the eulogy, Lincoln said of Clay: 
No one was so habitually careful to avoid all sectional ground. Whatever he did, 
he did for the whole country. In the construction of his measures he ever careful-
ly surveyed every part of the field, and duly weighed every conflicting interest. 
Feeling, as he did, and as the truth surely is, that the world's best hope depend-
ed on the continued Union of these States, he was ever jealous of, and watchful 
for, whatever might have the slightest tendency to separate them.180 
 
The eulogy continued on and Lincoln reached the topic of slavery.  Instead of avoiding the peri-
lous subject on such a somber occasion, Lincoln charged ahead, describing Clay’s perspective of 
slavery in a most insightful way: 
Cast into life where slavery was already widely spread and deeply seated, he did 
not perceive, as I think no wise man has perceived, how [slavery] could be at 
once eradicated, without producing a greater evil, even to the cause of human 
liberty itself. His feeling and his judgment, therefore, ever led him to oppose 
both extremes of opinion on the subject. Those who would shiver into fragments 
the Union of these States; tear to tatters its now venerated Constitution...rather 
than slavery should continue a single hour...But I would also, if I could, array 
[Clay’s] name, opinions, and influence against the opposite extreme -- against a 
few, but an increasing number of men, who, for the sake of perpetuating slavery, 
are beginning to assail and to ridicule the white man's charter of freedom -- the 
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declaration that "all men are created free and equal”...  Henry Clay belonged to 
his country -- to the world, mere party cannot claim men like him. His career has 
been national -- his fame has filled the earth -- his memory will endure to the last 
syllable of recorded time.181 
 
Henry Clay’s political ideology was designed in such a way that he could maintain a 
moderate and propitiative stance that placed the perpetuation of the Union over the fight 
against slavery.   Despite being attacked, judged, and condemned by both extremes, he main-
tained course and ardently fought for the preservation of the country.  Lincoln ended his eulogy 
with a question and a prayer as he said: 
Our country is prosperous and powerful; but could it have been quite all it has 
been, and is, and is to be, without Henry Clay? Such a man the times have de-
manded, and such, in the providence of God was given us. But he is gone. Let us 
strive to deserve, as far as mortals may, the continued care of Divine Providence, 
trusting that, in future national emergencies, He will not fail to provide us the in-
struments of safety and security.182 
 
Prophetically and providentially, Lincoln was pleading that Americans honor Clay’s 
memory by compromising on the issue of slavery before Clay’s greatest fear came true: when 
one side of the Union would call the other side its enemy.  Unfortunately, the death of Henry 
Clay and Lincoln’s eloquent eulogy did little to douse the fires of partisanship and hostility.  The 
spirit of unity that Clay embodied was slowly abandoned over the next few years and was en-
tirety forgotten by the end of the decade.  In 1861, almost ten years after his death, Clay’s hard 
work and compromise seemed to be for naught, and the country he loved so passionately was 
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in a Civil War over the issues of slavery and Constitutional rights, which even the great Henry 
Clay could not resolve.   
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